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Johnson: Indeconstructible: The Triumph of the Environmental "Administrati

INDECONSTRUCTIBLE: THE TRIUMPH OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL “ADMINISTRATIVE STATE”
Stephen M. Johnson*

INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the 2017 Presidential inauguration, a senior advisor to
the President proclaimed that a top priority of the Administration would
be the “deconstruction of the administrative state.”1 A primary target of
the Administration’s deconstruction efforts was the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) and federal environmental regulations.2
While the Administration has set a lofty goal, it will ultimately fail to
accomplish that goal.
While the President can use a variety of tools, including the
appointment power, budget power, treaty power, and executive orders,
to influence the manner in which the EPA and other agencies interpret
and enforce laws,3 the President has very little power to unilaterally
“deconstruct the administrative state.” The “administrative state” is a
creation of Congress,4 and the President can only “deconstruct” it with
the full cooperation of Congress. While the current Congress appears
willing to change some of the procedures that administrative agencies
must follow when taking action5 and to overturn some agency actions
with which Congress disagrees,6 it does not appear willing to eliminate
agencies or significantly reduce or eliminate their powers. The

* Walter F. George Professor of Law, Mercer University Law School. B.S., J.D. Villanova University,
LL.M. George Washington University School of Law.
1. See Z. Byron Wolf, Steve Bannon Outlines His Plan to “Deconstruct” Washington, CNN,
Feb. 24, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/23/politics/steve-bannon-world-view/ (last visited June 21,
2017) (discussing remarks made by top White House adviser Steve Bannon at the Conservative Political
Action Conference on February 23, 2017).
2. See Jeremy Symons, Trump’s War on the EPA: Deconstruction, THE HUFFINGTON POST,
Mar. 2, 2017, http://tiny.cc/7z3yly (last visited June 21, 2017). See also infra notes 29-35, and
accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 29-35, and accompanying text.
4. Agencies are usually created by statutes and statutes outline the limits of agencies’ powers.
See, e.g., Richard Henry Seamon, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK, 1213 (Carolina Academic Press 2013); Stephen G. Breyer, Richard B. Stewart, Cass R. Sunstein, Adrian
Vermeule, and Michael E. Herz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT,
AND CASES 37 (7th ed. Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 2011). See also Louisiana Public Serv.
Commn. v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (an agency “literally has no power to act . . . unless and until
Congress confers power on it.”).
5. See infra Part III.B. (describing the proposed Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017,
Regulatory Integrity Act of 2017, and Regulations From the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of
2017).
6. See infra Part IV.A.
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Constitution, the Administrative Procedures Act,7 and the statutes that
create administrative agencies and give them their power all create a
complex system of checks and balances to ensure that the President has
very little power to deconstruct the administrative state on his own.8
The “administrative state” was born in the Progressive era of the 19th
century9 and was considerably expanded during the New Deal era in the
middle of the 20th century.10 After a century and a quarter of
fortification, the “administrative state” is not likely to “go gently into
that dark night.”11
President Trump’s efforts to “deconstruct” federal environmental
regulation present a clear example of how the checks and balances of the
Constitution and the statutory structure of the “administrative state”
prevent the “deconstruction of the administrative state” unless the
President and Congress cooperate to make sweeping changes to the
underlying laws.
Beginning in the 1970’s, Congress passed a series of environmental
laws—frequently in bipartisan fashion—that gave the EPA significant
duties and responsibilities for protecting the environment.12 Those laws
provide States and citizens with significant power to force the EPA to
carry out those duties and provide States and local governments with
power to take more aggressive measures than the federal government to
protect the environment, if necessary.13 Despite the general antiregulatory rhetoric that has proliferated in political campaigns over the
last few decades, Congress has not repealed or significantly amended
those laws to reduce the powers of agencies, States, or citizens.14
Congress’ failure to take such broad action is not surprising in light of
the strong public support for environmental protection and
environmental regulation. According to several recent polls, a majority
7. 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq. (2012).
8. See infra notes 39-50, and accompanying text.
9. See Breyer et al., supra note 4, at 17-19; Adam Mossoff, The Use And Abuse of IP at the
Birth of the Administrative State, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2003 (2009).
10. See Breyer et al., supra note 4, at 19-23; Mark Fenster, The Birth of a "Logical System":
Thurman Arnold and the Making of Modern Administrative Law, 84 OR. L. REV. 69, 75 (2005); Robert
L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1243-1253 (1986).
11. The allusion is to the poetry of Dylan Thomas. See Dylan Thomas, Do Not Go Gentle into
That Good Night, THE POEMS OF DYLAN THOMAS 239 (New Directions rev. ed. 2003).
12. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (2012) (Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”)); 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251, et seq. (2012) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f et seq. (2012) (Safe Drinking
Water Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq. (2012) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”)); 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (2012) (Clean Air Act).
13. See infra notes 44-48, and accompanying text.
14. At the same time, though, the bi-partisan support for expanding environmental protection has
waned, so that there has only been one major amendment to any of the federal environmental laws in the
last quarter century. See The Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, P.L. 11482, 130 Stat. 448 (2016), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2576/text (last visited
June 21, 2017) (amending TSCA).
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of Americans believe that stricter environmental laws and regulations
are worth the cost,15 that alternative energy development should be
given priority over fossil fuel development,16 and that the EPA’s powers
should be preserved or expanded, as opposed to being reduced.17 Public
opposition to the President’s plan to curtail federal environmental
protection was clearly demonstrated by dramatic increases in fundraising for environmental organizations after the President’s election18
and by the hundreds of thousands of Americans who joined in protest
marches in the months immediately following the President’s
inauguration.19 During that same time period, when federal agencies
15. See Kristen Bialik, Most Americans Favor Stricter Environmental Laws and Regulations,
Pew
Research
Center,
Dec.
14,
2016,
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/12/14/most-americans-favor-stricter-environmental-laws-an
d-regulations/ (last visited June 21, 2017) (citing a Pew Research survey conducted between November
30, 2016 and December 5, 2016, in which 59% of respondents indicated that stricter environmental laws
and regulations were worth the cost).
16. See Brian Kennedy, Two-thirds of Americans Give Priority to Developing Alternative Energy
over
Fossil
Fuels,
Pew
Research
Center,
Jan.
23,
2017,
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/23/two-thirds-of-americans-give-priority-to-developingalternative-energy-over-fossil-fuels/ (last visited June 21, 2017) (citing a 2017 Pew Research survey in
which 65% of respondents supported prioritizing alternative energy production). In a March 2017
Gallup poll, 72% of respondents favored spending more government money on developing solar and
wind power. See Gallup, Environment, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1615/environment.aspx (last visited
June 21, 2017).
17. See Chris Kahn, Unlike Trump, Americans Want Strong Environmental Regulator,
Reuters/ipsos, Reuters, Jan. 17, 2017, http://tiny.cc/z23yly (last visited June 21, 2017) (citing a
Reuters/Ipsos poll conducted between December 16, 2016 through January 12, 2017, in which more
than 60% of respondents indicated that they would like to see the EPA’s powers preserved or
strengthened under President Trump). In a separate March 2017 Gallup poll, 56% of respondents
indicated that protection of the environment should be given priority over protection of the economy,
69% of respondents indicated that they favor “more strongly enforcing federal regulations”, 59% said
that the government was doing “too little to protect the environment,” and 57% said that they thought
that the quality of the environment was getting worse. See Gallup, Environment,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1615/environment.aspx (last visited June 21, 2017).
18. See Ben Wolfgang, Trump Helps Drive Donations to Environmental Groups, WASH. TIMES,
Feb.
9,
2017,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/feb/9/trump-helps-drive-donations-to-environmental-grou
p/ (last visited June 21, 2017). Between election day and the end of January, 2017, Earthjustice
increased fundraising by 160%, the Sierra Club increased fundraising by 700% and added 30,000 new
monthly donors, and the League of Conservation Voters increased fundraising by 100%. See Brian
Dabbs, Environmentalists Boast Record Fundraising, Membership Levels, BNA Daily Env’t Rept., Feb.
8, 2017, http://tiny.cc/x33yly (last visited June 21, 2017). According to data collected by Charity
Navigator, overall contributions to environmental causes during the first 100 days of President Trump’s
Administration increased by 388% and contributions to the Environmental Defense Fund increased by
388%. See Jan Sjostrom, The Trump Effect? Giving to Civil Rights, Environmental Groups Is up in First
100 Days, Palm Beach Daily News, April 29, 2017, http://tiny.cc/a43yly (last visited June 21, 2017).
19. On April 22, 2017, a March for Science was held in Washington, D.C., with more than 600
satellite marches being held in every state in the United States, as well as cities on every continent
except Antarctica. See Ben Guarino, Every Continent, and One Time Lord, Turned out for the March for
Science, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2017, http://tiny.cc/x43yly (last visited June 21, 2017). While the
marches were “not partisan” according to organizers, they were motivated, in part, by the attacks that
the Trump Administration has leveled on the use of science in regulation. See Wynne Davis, Saturday's
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sought public input on plans to eliminate environmental regulations20 or
abolish national monuments,21 hundreds of thousands of Americans
voiced their strong opposition in public comments.22 Citizens also
voiced their support for the EPA, environmental protection, and
environmental regulation at town meetings held by legislators.23 Since
legislators do not want to be viewed as “anti-environment” and
anticipate that they may be voted out of office if they act too
aggressively,24 they are unlikely to repeal or significantly amend the
federal environmental laws to reduce or eliminate the powers of federal
agencies, States, or citizens. Even if a majority of the Senate were to
align with the President to support such legislation against the popular
will of the people, there is likely a sufficient minority of the Senate that
would oppose such legislation and could block it through filibuster.25
For the time being, therefore, it seems unlikely that Congress and the
President will be able to work together to pass legislation to
significantly reduces or eliminates federal environmental regulation or
federal agencies’ powers.
While Congress and the President are not working together to
March Aims To Stand Up For Science, NPR, The Two Way, Apr. 22, 2017, http://tiny.cc/j53yly (last
visited June 21, 2017). Only a week after the March for Science, hundreds of thousands of Americans
participated in the People’s Climate March in Washington, D.C. and more than 375 satellite locations.
See Chris Mooney, Joe Heim and Brady Dennis, Climate March Draws Massive Crowd to D.C. in
Sweltering Heat, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2017, http://tiny.cc/w53yly (last visited June 21, 2017);
Nicholas Fandos, Climate March Draws Thousands of Protesters Alarmed by Trump’s Environmental
Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2017, http://tiny.cc/153yly (last visited June 21, 2017).
20. 82 Fed. Reg. 17,793 (April 13, 2017).
21. 82 Fed. Reg. 22,016 (May 11, 2017).
22. The vast majority of the more than 55,000 comments appearing online by the official close of
the comment period urged the EPA to leave existing regulations in place or impose more stringent rules.
See Brady Dennis, EPA Asked the Public About Which Regulations to Gut - and Got an Earful About
Leaving Them Alone, WASH. POST, May 16, 2017, http://tiny.cc/353yly (last visited June 21, 2017). As
of June 1, 2017, the EPA’s docket for the notice indicated that the agency had received over 300,000
comments. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Evaluation of Existing Regulations,
https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=EPA-HQ-OA-2017-0190 (last visited June 21, 2017).
23. See Rachel Leven, Climate, Environment Raised in GOP Town Halls; Will It Matter?, BNA
Daily Env’t. Rept., Apr. 18, 2017, https://www.bna.com/climate-environment-raised-n57982086837/
(last visited June 21, 2017).
24. Id. See also Tonya Lewis and Jessica Owley, Symbolic Politics for Disempowered
Communities: State Environmental Justice Policies, 29 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 183, 210 (2014).
25. Because the Senate Rules normally allow for unlimited debate on legislation, a minority of
the Senate can prevent the Senate from passing legislation by “filibustering” - continuing to debate the
legislation and preventing the Senate from voting on the legislation. See U.S. Senate, Filibuster and
Cloture, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm (last
visited June 21, 2017). The only way to end a filibuster is to invoke “cloture”, which allows the Senate
to limit consideration of a pending matter to an additional 30 hours of debate. See Sen. Comm. on Rules
& Admin, Standing Rules of the Senate, S. Doc. No. 113-18, at R. XXII, P 2 (2013). Sixty votes are
required to invoke cloture. Id. Consequently, as long as 41 Senators oppose legislation, they have the
power, through the filibuster, to prevent the Senate from voting to enact the legislation, even though a
majority of the Senate may support the legislation.
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fundamentally deconstruct the administrative state, both Congress and
the President took steps in the first months of the Trump Administration
to weaken federal environmental regulation. For reasons outlined in this
article, however, the long-term effect of those measures will be far less
significant than the “deconstruction of the administrative state.”
Within the first few months of the new administration, Congress took
a few steps to overturn environmental regulations and to make it more
difficult for agencies to adopt new regulations. In light of the lack of
public support for environmental deregulation, however, Congress took
these steps in ways designed to limit public involvement and
transparency. First, Congress repealed several recently finalized
environmental regulations through a streamlined legislative process
authorized by the Congressional Review Act of 1996.26 Then, legislators
proposed bills that would change the procedures that agencies are
required to use to adopt new rules.27 While the proposed administrative
process changes might appear convoluted and impenetrable to the
public, they are designed to significantly complicate the process for
adopting new rules.28
The deregulatory efforts of Congress were significantly less
aggressive than the efforts of the President, who, within his first few
months in office, took several bold steps under his appointment power,
budget power, treaty power, and other executive powers to attempt to
demoralize and weaken EPA and the U.S. Department of Interior
(“DOI”) and to roll back environmental protections. The President
appointed climate change skeptics and anti-regulatory proponents to
both agencies, all of whom fundamentally disagreed with many of the
policies adopted by the agencies to which they were appointed.29 The
President then proposed to cut the budget of the EPA by one-third;30 he
issued a series of Executive Orders and directives that required the
agencies to stop issuing new regulations31 and to review and revise or
repeal many existing regulations;32 and he required the DOI to review
and propose revision or abolition of dozens of national monuments.33
26. Congressional Review Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, subtit. E, 110 Stat. 868-74
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2012)).
27. See infra Part III.B.
28. Id. Ironically, if enacted, the additional procedural requirements could complicate the
President’s deregulatory efforts to eliminate existing rules. See supra notes 214-216, 241, and
accompanying text.
29. See infra Part I.
30. See infra Part II.
31. See infra Part III.A. (discussing Executive Order 13,771 and the President’s January 20,
2017 Memorandum to Heads of Executive Agencies and Departments).
32. See infra Part IV.B. (discussing Executive Orders 13,777, 13,778, and 13,783).
33. See Exec. Order No. 13,792 of April 26, 2017, Review of Designations Under the Antiquities
Act,
82
Fed.
Reg.
20429
(Apr.
26,
2017),
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Armed with significant enforcement discretion, the new EPA
Administrator can also “deregulate” by choosing to not aggressively
enforce environmental laws or regulations.34 Finally, the President
announced an intention to withdraw from the international agreement to
address climate change.35
While the long-term prospects for the environment may seem grim in
light of the flurry of Executive action, the Constitution, administrative
law, and environmental laws impose checks and balances on the
President to limit any long-term damage he may cause. Scholars
frequently raise concerns about the expansion in Presidential control
over agency policymaking.36 They fear that, without checks and
balances, the President could direct agencies to implement policies that
conflict with Congressional will, are adopted without the public input
and transparency required by federal law, and are based on political,
rather than scientific or technical, bases.37 The checks and balances
imposed by the courts, the public, and Congress through the
Constitution and federal statutes are designed to ensure that the
Executive Branch decisions honor the will of Congress, are made in
democratically accountable ways, and are based on expertise, rather than
raw politics.38 For each of the actions that the President has taken or
proposed to take to dismantle environmental regulation, there is a
corresponding set of checks and balances.
The President’s budget and appointment power, for instance, is
shared with Congress, which can reject or modify his actions.39 To the
extent that the President acts through Executive Orders, he can only act
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/26/presidential-executive-order-review-designatio
ns-under-antiquities-act (last visited June 21, 2017).
34. See infra Part V.
35. See Valerie Volcovici and Jeff Mason, Trump Dismays, Angers Allies By Abandoning Global
Climate Pact, Reuters, June 2, 2017, http://tiny.cc/963yly (last visited June 21, 2017). The EPA
Administrator Scott Pruitt strongly advocated for U.S. exit from the accord, while Rex Tillerson,
Secretary of State and former EXXON chief executive, urged the President to remain a party to the
agreement. See Chris Mooney & Brad Dennis, Scott Pruitt Calls for an ‘Exit’ from the Paris Accord,
Sharpening the Trump White House’s Climate Rift, WASH. POST, April 14, 2017, http://tiny.cc/q93yly
(last visited June 21, 2017).
36. See, e.g., Catherine Y. Kim, Presidential Control Across Policymaking Tools, 43 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 91, 92 (2015); David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an
Age of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095 (2008); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael
P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential
Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency
Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010); Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to
Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006).
37. See Kim, supra note 36, at 92. See also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003); Jody Freeman
& Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51 (2007).
38. See Kim, supra note 36, at 92.
39. See infra Parts I and II.
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within the authority already granted to the Executive branch by the
Constitution and Congress, and the next President can unilaterally
overturn his actions through an Executive order.40 To the extent that
agencies choose to repeal or revise regulations in response to the
directives in the Executive orders, principles of administrative law
require the agencies to follow rulemaking procedures of Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”), which provide for ample public participation,
and to support their decisions to repeal or revise regulations with
reasonable explanations that are not based solely on the change in
Administration.41 The procedures for changing those rules are timeconsuming and resource intensive.42 The environmental laws and the
APA provide citizens with the opportunity to challenge the agency’s
actions in court, which guarantees that the judicial branch provides an
additional check on the Executive action.43
To the extent that agencies decide that they will not promulgate new
rules or will not enforce existing rules, the administrative and
environmental laws provide additional checks on such agency inaction.
The environmental laws frequently authorize States to administer and
enforce the federal laws in place of the EPA.44 In addition, those laws
authorize States and citizens to sue to enforce the laws even when the
federal government will not bring an enforcement action.45 Those same
laws frequently require agencies to adopt regulations in some instances,
and they allow citizens to sue the agencies if they do not adopt those
rules.46 In addition, even if agencies are not required by law to adopt
rules, the APA authorizes citizens to petition agencies to make rules,
and it authorizes citizens to challenge the agencies’ decision to deny
those requests.47
The federal environmental laws provide further protection for the
environment because they generally provide that states and local
governments can establish and enforce their own environmental laws
that are at least as stringent as the federal law.48 Thus, even if the federal
40. See infra notes 96, 101, and accompanying text.
41. See infra Part IV.B.
42. See infra notes 191-216, and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2012) (APA presumption of reviewability for final agency
actions); 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (2012) (Clean Water Act judicial review provision); 42 U.S.C. § 6976 (2012)
(RCRA judicial review provision); 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2012) (Clean Air Act judicial review provision).
44. See, e.g. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b); 1344(g) (2012) (Clean Water Act Section 402 and 404
permitting programs); 42 U.S.C. §6926 (2012) (RCRA hazardous waste permitting program); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7661a(d) (2012) (Clean Air Act permitting program).
45. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. §300j-8(a) (2012) (Safe
Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2012) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012) (Clean Air Act).
46. See infra notes 97-99, 185-186, and accompanying text.
47. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012).
48. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §1370 (2012) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2012) (RCRA); 42
U.S.C. §7416 (2012) (Clean Air Act).
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agencies are not enforcing their laws, States and local governments can
enforce their own laws to protect the environment.
There is one more vital dynamic that is likely to limit the long-term
harm to the environment that could be caused by unilateral Executive
action: the response of the regulated community to the Administration’s
unilateral actions. Regulated entities must engage in long-term planning.
They must also recognize that, while the current Administration may
adopt guidance documents that relax regulation and may choose to avoid
enforcing environmental regulations, everything could change with the
next Administration unless there are changes to the underlying
regulations, which may be difficult for reasons outlined in this article.49
In addition, as outlined above, even if the federal government chooses
not to enforce the federal environmental laws, States and citizens could
enforce those laws or separate state or local laws against the regulated
entities.50 In light of that, regulated entities are unlikely to take
significant actions to relax compliance with the existing federal laws and
regulations unless it is possible to reverse those actions at a low cost to
comply with increased enforcement of the laws and regulations or to
comply with more stringent regulations that may be imposed by the next
Administration.
To outline the checks and balances that limit the power of Congress
and the President to fundamentally “deconstruct the administrative
state,” this article will explore the actions taken by Congress and the
President at the beginning of the Trump Administration, as well as the
potential long-term effects of those actions. Part I focuses on the
President’s power under the Appointments Clause to appoint the EPA
Administrator and DOI Secretary. Part II examines the President’s
authority to deregulate through the Budget Power. Part III explores the
authority of the President to limit the adoption of new environmental
rules, as well as Congress’ efforts to limit the adoption of regulations
generally. Part IV examines the power of the President and Congress to
repeal or revise existing regulations. Finally, Part V discusses the
authority of agencies to deregulate by relaxing enforcement of
environmental laws and regulations.
I. THE PRESIDENT’S APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL POWER
In the context of the deconstruction of the environmental
“administrative state,” perhaps the most effective weapon in the
President’s arsenal is the power to appoint and remove the
Administrator of the EPA, the Secretary of Interior, and other agency
49. See infra Part IV.B.
50. See supra notes 44-45, and accompanying text.
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“officers.”51 For environmental law, the appointment power is
significant because the federal environmental statutes grant very broad
discretion to environmental agencies to determine how stringently to set
regulatory standards and how to enforce those standards.52 While the
statutes may require an agency to set standards and to consider certain
factors when setting standards, there are usually a range of ways that the
agency could set the standard to meet the legal requirements, with some
of the options being more stringent and costly than others. Similarly,
statutes rarely require agencies to bring enforcement actions whenever
there is a violation of the law. Instead, they authorize the agencies to
bring enforcement actions and allow the agency to determine how to
allocate enforcement resources in the most efficient manner.53
Consequently, the laws that are currently on the books could be
interpreted and applied in widely different ways, depending on who is
directing the agency’s exercise of discretion. In addition to appointing
the EPA Administrator and the DOI Secretary, the President has the
power to appoint many other high-level agency officials.54
The Constitution does impose a check on the President’s appointment
power in that it provides that the President shall appoint officers “with
the advice and consent of the Senate.”55 However, this check is
relatively weak when the President is a member of the same political
party that controls a majority of seats in the Senate. In 2013, the Senate
rules were changed so that a filibuster could not be used to prevent a
vote on judges and high-level officers of the United States, including
Cabinet nominees.56 Consequently, a simple majority in the senate can
51. See U.S. CONST., art. II, §2, cl. 2. The EPA Administrator is one of the “officers” appointed
by the President. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 199 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app. at 643 (2012).
52. See J.B. Ruhl & Kyle Robisch, Agencies Running from Agency Discretion, 58 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 97, 101, 109-110 (2016); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 469 (1986); Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1299 (1997); Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487
(1983).
53. See infra Part V.
54. See, Wendy Wagner, William West, Thomas McGarity, and Lisa Peters, Dynamic
Rulemaking 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 196 (2017) (noting that the President has authority to appoint
almost 700 officials across the Executive Branch); David E. Lewis, The Contemporary Presidency: The
Personnel Process in the Modern Presidency, 42 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 577, 578–79 (2012); Anne
Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 471, 484-485
(2011) [hereinafter “O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking”]. Over the last several Administrations, the lower
level positions are being filled very slowly. Id. at 532. Only 64% of the positions requiring Senate
confirmation were filled during the first year of President Obama’s first Administration. Id. While the
delay in filling those positions could delay agency actions that might impose burdens on the regulated
community, it could also delay important deregulatory policy changes and regulatory repeals.
55. See U.S. CONST., art. II, §2, cl. 2.
56. See William G. Dauster, The Senate in Transition or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Nuclear Option, 19 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 631, 632 (2016). The rules were changed by
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approve a Cabinet officer. Additionally, since the majority of the public
is unlikely to recognize how influential the appointment of an agency
secretary or administrator may be, a Senator is not likely to fear the
same level of public disapproval when the Senator votes to approve the
appointment of the official as they would if they were voting to repeal
major portions of the federal environmental laws.
In light of the weak checks on the President’s appointment power,
therefore, one of the strongest steps that President Trump has taken to
deconstruct the environmental “administrative state” has been to appoint
the EPA Administrator and the DOI Secretary. In each case, the
President appointed anti-regulatory nominees who appeared to
fundamentally disagree with the missions of the agencies they would
lead. For the EPA Administrator, the President appointed Scott Pruitt,
the Oklahoma Attorney General who sued the EPA fourteen times while
he was Attorney General, arguing that the federal environmental
regulations were too stringent and interfered with states’ rights.57
Environmental advocates were particularly concerned about this
nomination since Pruitt rejected the scientific consensus on climate
change58 and was much more heavily influenced by fracking and energy
interests than science during his tenure as Attorney General.59 Hundreds
of EPA employees protested the nomination and nearly 450 former
the “Reid Precedent”, advanced by then Majority Leader Harry Reid, as a way to force votes on
President Obama’s judicial nominees. Id.
57. See Kahn, supra note 17. See also John Siciliano, Senate Confirms Scott Pruitt to Head EPA,
Wash.
Exam.,
Feb.
17,
2017,
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/senate-confirms-scott-pruitt-to-head-epa/article/2615162
(last
visited June 21, 2017); Evan Halper, After Bruising Battle, Climate Change Skeptic Scott Pruitt
TIMES,
Feb.
17,
2017,
Confirmed
to
Lead
EPA,
L.A.
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-epa-pruitt-20180217-story.html (last visited June 21,
2017); Brady Dennis, Scott Pruitt, Longtime Adversary of EPA, Confirmed to Lead the Agency, WASH.
POST, Feb. 17, 2017, http://tiny.cc/pa4yly (last visited June 21, 2017).
58. See Siciliano, supra note 57; Halper, supra note 57. Shortly after his confirmation, in an
interview on a morning cable news program, Pruitt indicated that he did not agree that human activity
was a primary contributor to global warming and argued that “we need to continue the review and
analysis.” See Robinson Meyer, Trump's EPA Chief Denies the Basic Science of Climate Change, The
Atlantic,
Mar.
9,
2017,
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/trumps-epa-chief-rejects-that-carbon-dioxide-emis
sions-cause-climate-change/519054/ (last visited June 21, 2017). Pruitt’s statement conflicts with the
consensus of the international scientific community and even with the marketing materials of the oil and
gas industry. Id. In light of those statements, it is not surprising that, after his appointment as
Administrator, Pruitt strongly advocated for the U.S. to exit the Paris agreement on climate change. See
Mooney & Dennis, supra note 35.
59. See Siciliano, supra note 57. Thousands of pages of e-mails released shortly after Pruitt’s
confirmation revealed the depth of the influence of the energy interests. See Coral Davenport & Eric
Lipton, The Pruitt Emails: E.P.A. Chief Was Arm in Arm With Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2017,
http://tiny.cc/jb4yly (last visited June 21, 2017). The e-mails revealed secret meetings between the
industry and Pruitt and demonstrated that the industry drafted many of the comments that Pruitt
submitted to federal agencies on behalf of the State. Id.
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employees wrote a letter to the Senate opposing the nomination.60 For
the Secretary of the Interior, the President appointed Montana
congressman Ryan Zinke, who is also a climate change skeptic and
fossil fuel advocate who supports increased resource extraction on
federal lands and who consistently voted against endangered species
protection while in Congress.61 Without the filibuster, a minority of
Senators resorted to a variety of procedural tactics to stall the
confirmation votes, but both nominees were eventually confirmed.62
While the EPA Administrator and the Secretary of the Interior can
exercise substantial influence in shaping the content of regulations and
the level of enforcement of federal laws and regulations, they can have
significant influence on the decision making process and public
involvement in the decision making process regarding environmental
policy in more subtle ways without engaging in rulemaking or
adjudication. For instance, both the EPA Administrator Pruitt and the
Secretary of the Interior Zinke acted, early in their tenures, to remove
scientists from advisory boards and to suspend or eliminate scientific
advisory boards, sending a clear message that they planned to deemphasize science in decision making.63 The “politicization” of science
at the agencies was not surprising in light of reports that the President,
60. See Dennis, supra note 57. See also Tribune News Services, Hundreds of Current and
Former EPA Employees Protest Trump’s Nominee in Chicago, Chi. Trib., Feb. 6, 2017,
http://tiny.cc/cc4yly (last visited June 21, 2017).
61. See Kahn, supra note 17. See also Ashley Killough and Ted Barrett, Senate Approves
Trump's
Nominee
for
Interior,
CNN,
Mar.
1,
2017,
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/01/politics/ryan-zinke-confirmation-vote-interior-secretary/ (last visited
June 21, 2017); Esther Wieldon & Annie Snider, Senate Confirms Ryan Zinke as Interior Secretary,
Politico,
Mar.
1,
2017,
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/ryan-zinke-confirmed-interior-secretary-235563 (last visited
June 21, 2017).
62. See Siciliano, supra note 57; Halper, supra note 57; Dennis, supra note 57; Wileldon &
Snider, supra note 61. When the Environment and Public Works Committee was scheduled to vote on
the nomination of Pruitt, all of the Democrats boycotted the meeting, which prevented a vote for lack of
a quorum. See Jack Fitzpatrick, Democrats Boycott Pruitt Vote; Barrasso May Suspend Quorum Rules,
The
Morning
Consult,
Feb.
1,
2017,
https://morningconsult.com/2017/02/01/democrats-boycott-pruitt-vote-barrasso-may-suspend-quorum-r
ules/ (last visited June 21, 2017). When the Democrats boycotted the committee meeting on the
following day, the Republican majority members of the committee suspended the committee rules to
allow a vote and reported Pruitt’s nomination to the full Senate. See Brady Dennis & Chris Mooney,
Senate Republicans Suspend Committee Rules to Approve Scott Pruitt, Trump’s EPA Nominee, WASH.
POST, Feb. 2, 2017, http://tiny.cc/ic4yly (last visited June 21, 2017).
63. See Juliet Eilperin and Brady Dennis, EPA Dismisses Half of Key Board’s Scientific
Advisers; Interior Suspends More Than 200 Advisory Panels, WASH. POST, May 8, 2017,
http://tiny.cc/5c4yly (last visited June 21, 2017). In early May, the EPA Administrator dismissed half of
the scientists who serve on the agency’s Board of Scientific Counselors. Id. In addition, in the EPA’s
proposed budget, funding for the agency’s Science Advisory Board would be cut by 84%. Id. Within
days of the Administrator’s action, Interior Secretary Zinke announced that he was suspending the work
of almost 200 advisory boards for the agency, while the agency reviewed the charter and charge of the
boards. Id.
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during the transition period prior to his inauguration, asked the
Department of Energy to provide the names of any scientists who
attended conferences addressing climate change.64
Transparency for agency decision making has also been under assault
at both agencies with the change in Administration. Shortly after the
President’s inauguration, the EPA and DOI employees were prohibited
from issuing press releases and posting messages on social media,65 and
dozens of agency web pages addressing climate change and other
important environmental matters were taken down by the agencies.66
The EPA Administrator and the Secretary of the Interior also wield
considerable power to shape environmental policy in non-transparent
ways because they can, like all agencies, adopt important interpretations
of laws and regulations through guidance with minimal procedures and
minimal public input.67
64. See Victoria McGrane, Trump Cracked down on Environmental Agencies, and the Internet
Fought Back, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 25, 2017, http://tiny.cc/rd4yly (last visited June 21, 2017). The agency
refused to comply and the President’s spokesman subsequently indicated that the request was not
authorized by the President. Id.
65. See McGrane, supra note 64. See also Michael Biesecker and John Flesher, President Trump
Institutes
Media
Blackout
at
EPA,
BOS.
GLOBE,
Jan.
24,
2017,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2017/01/24/trump-bans-epa-employees-from-updating-publ
ic-via-press-social-media/Anr90pkwhavC2kzK8pwsyK/story.html (last visited June 21, 2017). Despite
the orders, a twitter account for the Badlands National Monument (within the Interior Department)
posted several tweets about climate change and an “alternative” twitter account claiming to be run by
National Park Service employees continued to post tweets about climate change and environmental
issues that were at variance with the positions of the new Administration. See McGrane, supra note 64.
66. See McGrane, supra note 64. See also Juliet Eilperin, The EPA Just Buried its Climate
Change Website for Kids, WASH. POST, May 6, 2017, http://tiny.cc/se4yly (last visited June 21, 2017);
Brian Kahn, The EPA’s Obama-Era Snapshot is Missing Information, Climate Central, May 5, 2017,
http://www.climatecentral.org/news/epa-obama-website-snapshot-missing-information-21420
(last
visited June 21, 2017). The White House removed all of the climate change information from its website
shortly after President Trump was inaugurated and the EPA removed its website of climate change
resources for students in April. See Eilpern, supra; Kahn, supra. The City of Chicago posted the
previous EPA material on its website and Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel indicated that the city would
be “developing tools so that the city and the public as a whole can easily save, archive and preserve
open data from public data portals, such as the EPA site.” See Eilpern, supra. Environmental advocates
had anticipated that the new Administration would remove significant amounts of environmental
information from the web when it took over, so many groups, including the Environmental Data and
Governance Initiative, worked to archive agency information and websites during the transition period
before President Trump’s inauguration. See Evan Halper, At Trump's EPA, Going to Work Can Be an
Act of Defiance, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2017, http://tiny.cc/jf4yly (last visited June 21, 2017).
67. See Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise? An Empirical Analysis of EPA Rulemaking
From 2001-2005, 38 Envtl. L. 101, 112-113 (2008) [hereinafter “Johnson, Ossification’s Demise?”];
Stephen M. Johnson, Good Guidance, Good Grief!, 72 MO. L. REV. 695, 700-01 (2007) [hereinafter
“Johnson, Good Guidance”]; Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing
Public Participation and Access to Government Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV.
277, 283-84 (1998) [hereinafter “Johnson, Internet”]; Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the
Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 528 (1997)
[hereinafter “McGarity, Response”]; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking,
47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 82 (1995) [hereinafter “Pierce, Seven Ways”]. In some agencies, interpretive
rules and policy statements comprise more than 90% of the agency “rules.” See Pierce, supra, at 82.
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Since the EPA Administrator and the Secretary of the Interior can
exert so much influence over the policies adopted by the agencies and
the manner in which agency employees administer the laws, the
President’s power to appoint them, with the very limited check imposed
by Senate approval, is perhaps the most potent tool available to the
President in deconstructing the environmental “administrative state.”
The power is ultimately limited, however, in that the actions that the
agency leaders take short of adopting new rules can generally be
reversed when a new Administration assumes power. Even if the EPA
Administrator and the Secretary of the Interior do not aggressively
enforce the laws and regulations while they are in power and adopt
guidance to soften the requirements of those laws and regulations,
subsequent agency leaders can reverse course.68
II. THE PRESIDENT’S BUDGET POWER
The President’s role in the development of agency budgets provides
the White House with another tool to shape the manner in which
agencies interpret and enforce the law.69 A President bent on
deconstructing the administrative state can take steps toward that goal
by seeking to eliminate or substantially reduce the budgets of agencies.
Even if the agency itself is not eliminated, its power and impact on
regulated entities will be greatly reduced if the agency is not provided
with funding to enforce the regulatory laws it is statutorily charged with
administering. The President implements the control over agency
budgets through the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) in the
White House.70 All agency budget requests are submitted to the OMB,
68. Admittedly, though, there may be some long-term harm to the agencies that cannot be easily
reversed. For instance, the appointment of Scott Pruitt as the EPA Administrator and the policies that he
is pursuing as Administrator, including his rejection of scientific and technical advice from employees,
has severely harmed the morale of long-time agency employees. See Tribune News Service, supra note
60. See also Halper, supra note 66. To the extent that career employees at the agencies become
frustrated and move on before there is a change in Administration, the agencies could lose significant
institutional memory and experience. William Ruckleshaus, the EPA Administrator under Presidents
Nixon and Reagan, indicated that he had never seen anything like the tumult that the EPA is facing with
the appointment of Scott Pruitt as Administrator and that “[i]t is going to set us back in ways we can’t
even predict.” Id.
69. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design,
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 42-43 (2010); Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1,
28-29 (2013). The President’s control over the budget of agencies derives from the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 20 (1921) and was expanded in the Reorganization
Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-19, 53 Stat. 561 (1939).
70. See Barkow, supra note 69, at 42. See also Michelle D. Christensen, The Executive Budget
Process: An Overview, Cong. Res. Serv. Rept. No. R42633, July 27, 2012, at 2. OMB is the successor to
the Bureau of the Budget, which was created as part of the Treasury Department by the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921, supra note 69. The powers of the Bureau were transferred to the President in
1970, who transferred them to OMB. See Exec. Order No. 11,541, 3 C.F.R. 10,737 (Supp. 1970).
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and the President can exert significant influence over agencies’ policies
and priorities by drastically reducing or refusing to request funding for
various programs.71 Through the OMB, the President also limits the
content of communications that agencies can have with Congress
regarding the budget process.72 The OMB also oversees agencies’
expenditure of funds after Congress allocates the funds to agencies.73
The OMB’s reach extends beyond budgeting, however, and agencies
must clear all legislative proposals, as well as communications with
Congress regarding legislation, through the OMB.74
While the President, thus, exerts substantial influence over the
contents of the agency budget that is sent to Congress for approval, the
budget is ultimately adopted through Congressional legislation, which
may have different priorities than the President and may enact a budget
that bears very little resemblance to the proposal submitted by the
President.75 While the President could veto the budget passed by
Congress and risk a government shutdown when appropriations for
government agencies expire under the prior budget legislation, it is
unusual for the President to take that step. In light of the fact that
OMB’s mission is “to assist the President in meeting his policy, budget, management and regulatory
objectives and to fulfill the agency’s statutory responsibilities.” See Office of Management and Budget,
Office of Management and Budget, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb. (last visited June 21, 2017). The
agency has responsibilities for five “services” for the White House, including budget development and
execution; management; regulatory policy, legislative clearance and coordination; and Executive Orders
and Presidential Memoranda. Id.
71. See Barkow, supra note 69, at 42-43; Christiansen, supra note 70, at 2-3. The process by
which agencies prepare and submit their budget requests to the President is set forth in guidance
prepared by OMB for the agencies. See Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular No. A-11,
Preparation
Submission
and
Execution
of
the
Budget,
July
2016,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars_a11_current_year_a11_toc/ (last visited June 21,
2017).
72. See Christiansen, supra note 70, at 5.
73. See Huq, supra note 69, at 28.
74. See Barkow, supra note 69, at 30-31; Office of Management and Budget, The Mission and
Structure
of
the
Office
of
Management
and
Budget,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/organization_mission/ (last visited June 21, 2017). OMB
Circular A-19 outlines the requirements and procedures for legislative coordination and clearance
through the White House. See Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-19, Legislative
Coordination
and
Clearance,
Sept.
20,
1979,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars_a019/ (last visited June 21, 2017). The guidance
requires agencies to coordinate with OMB and obtain clearance for all legislative proposals, testimony
and letters on pending legislation, and other transmittals to Congress communicating legislative views of
recommendations. Id. The goals of the clearance process are “to ensure that (1) agencies legislative
communications are consistent with the President’s policies and objectives; and (2) the Administration
‘speaks with one voice’ regarding legislation.” See Memorandum from Mick Mulvaney, OMB Director,
to Agency Heads, Legislative Coordination and Clearance, M-17-19; Feb. 28, 2017,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/28/memorandum-heads-departments-and-agencie
s (last visited June 21, 2017).
75. Congress’ role in the budgeting process is outlined in the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (July 12, 1974).
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Congress and the President share the budget power, it will only function
as an effective tool to deconstruct the administrative state if both the
President and Congress agree to reduce the power of agencies by
dramatically reducing their budgets. If the will of Congress and the
President aligned on that goal, it would be easier to accomplish this
incremental step toward deconstruction than it would be to pass laws to
eliminate the agencies or agencies’ powers (a much more effective
means of deconstruction), since a minority of the Senate could not
prevent the weakening of the agencies in the budget process, as a
filibuster is not available in the Senate for budget legislation.76 Even
though both houses of Congress are currently controlled by the same
political party as the President, Congress does not appear to be
interested in instituting drastic budget cuts for environmental agencies to
deconstruct the administrative state at this time.
President Trump attempted to use his budget power as a means of
deconstructing the EPA and environmental regulations when he sent
Congress a proposal to reduce the agency’s funding by almost one-third
and to cut agency staff by one-fifth.77 The President’s proposed budget
would have eliminated 50 programs administered by the agency,
including its Environmental Justice office.78 The proposal also included
cuts of almost 50% of funding for grant programs for state
environmental programs,79 30% of funding for Superfund cleanups,80
and 84% of funding for the agency’s Science Advisory Board,81 as well
as deep cuts for enforcement activities,82 programs for redevelopment of

76. Id. See also Tonja Jacobi & Jeff VanDam, The Filibuster and Reconciliation: The Future of
Majoritarian Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 261 (2013).
77. See Christine Todd Whitman, I Ran George W. Bush’s EPA—and Trump’s Cuts to the
Agency
Would
Endanger
Lives,
The
Atlantic,
Mar.
31,
2017,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/trumps-epa-cuts-budget/521223/ (last visited June
21, 2017) ; Margo Oge & Drew Kodjak, What Americans Risk Losing if Trump Slashes the EPA’s
Budget, Fortune, Apr. 18, 2017, http://fortune.com/2017/04/18/epa-donald-trump-budget-cuts/ (last
visited June 21, 2017); Rafi Letzter, Trump’s Epa Cuts Are Great News for Polluters, but Bad News for
His
Voters,
Business
Insider,
Mar.
16,
2017,
http://www.businessinsider.com/what-trumps-budget-would-really-mean-for-the-epa-2017-3
(last
visited June 21, 2017). The proposed cuts would reduce the agency’s budget to its lowest level in 40
years. See Whitman, supra. In anticipation of the cuts, the EPA developed plans to lay off 25% of its
employees and eliminate 56 programs, so that it could preserve more money to fund grants for state
programs. See Juliet Eilperin, Chris Mooney & Steven Mufson, New EPA Documents Reveal Even
Deeper Proposed Cuts to Staff and Programs, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2017, http://tiny.cc/8f4yly (last
visited June 21, 2017).
78. See Letzter, supra note 77.
79. See John Siciliano, Trump's EPA Cuts Risk Fight with State' Environmental Agencies, Wash.
Examiner, Apr. 24, 2017, http://tiny.cc/yg4yly (last visited June 21, 2017).
80. See Letzter, supra note 77.
81. See Eilperin, Mooney & Mufson, supra note 77.
82. See Letzter, supra note 77.
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“brownfields” (former waste disposal sites),83 and programs to restore
water quality and the environment in the Great Lakes and the
Chesapeake Bay.84 If Congress had adopted a budget that was similar to
that proposed by the President, the EPA could have suffered severe
long-term harm due to the loss of thousands of dedicated employees and
their expertise and institutional memory. In addition, even if the
eliminated programs could have been re-established in a future
administration, it would take significant resources to rebuild that
framework in the future, and the harm to the environment and public
health caused by the elimination of the programs in the interim could be
dramatic.
However, many of the programs that the President planned to cut or
drastically reduce provide millions of dollars of federal money to
states.85 Consequently, legislators, States, and even the EPA
Administrator balked at the cuts.86 When Congress ultimately adopted
stopgap budget legislation to keep the government operating through
September, 2017, the EPA’s budget was only cut by 1%, with no
reduction in workforce.87 Thus, the President’s budget power has so far
proved to be a significantly weaker tool than the appointment power for
deconstructing the administrative state.

83. See Kevin Lamarque, Trump Proposes EPA Budget Cuts, Targets Climate, Clean Water
Programs,
Newsweek,
Mar.
2,
2017,
http://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-epa-environmental-protection-agency-environment-water-cli
mate-563148 (last visited June 21, 2017).
84. See Whitman, supra note 77. The proposed budget would reduce funding for the Great Lakes
Restoration Initiative by 90%, from $300 million to $10 million and would eliminate funding for the
Chesapeake Bay Program. Id.
85. See Siciliano, supra note 79; Lamarque, supra note 83.
86. See Letzter, supra note 77; Siciliano, supra note 79; Lamarque, supra note 83. Pruitt
indicated to state and local government leaders that it was important to preserve funding for
brownfields, Superfund, drinking water and other state grant programs. See Brady Dennis, Here’s One
Part of the EPA That the Agency’s New Leader Wants to Protect, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2017,
http://tiny.cc/dh4yly (last visited June 21, 2017).
87. See Joel Achenbach, Ben Guarino, Sarah Kaplan & Darryl Fears, Science Funding Spared
Under Congressional Budget Deal, but More Battles Ahead, WASH. POST, May 1, 2017,
http://tiny.cc/sh4yly (last visited June 21, 2017); Robert Walton, Last-Minute Congressional Budget
Compromise
Saves
EPA,
ARPA-E
Funding
,
Utility
Dive,
May
1,
2017,
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/last-minute-congressional-budget-compromise-saves-epa-arpa-e-fundi
ng/441655/ (last visited June 21, 2017). See also U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. House Committee
on Appropriations, FY 2017 Omnibus Summary – Interior and Environment Appropriations,
https://appropriations.house.gov/UploadedFiles/05.01.17_FY_2017_Omnibus_-_Interior_-_Summary.p
df (last visited June 21, 2017).
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III. THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS TO LIMIT THE
ADOPTION OF NEW RULES
A. The President’s Power to Limit the Adoption of New Rules
Even if the President and Congress are not willing to deconstruct the
administrative state by enacting legislation to eliminate agencies or
reduce their powers, they can take a small step toward deconstruction by
preventing the agencies from adopting new rules. Federal agencies
generally have broad authority to decide whether and when to adopt
rules, so a President can often encourage an agency to exercise its
discretion to not adopt new rules.88 In addition, if an agency has begun a
rulemaking process to adopt a rule that the agency was not required by
law to adopt, the President can encourage the agency to conclude that
process without adopting a final rule.89 The President might attempt to
stop agency rulemaking informally through communications with the
agency leaders, reminding the agency of the President’s appointment
and budgeting powers.90 The President could also take a more visible
action to limit the adoption of agency rules by issuing an Executive
88. See O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking, supra note 54, at 482-483 (2011). Most federal
environmental statutes give the EPA broad authority to adopt rules within a range of discretion that
extends as far as “necessary” to carry out the laws. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a) (authorizing the EPA
Administrator to “prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his functions under the Clean
Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(a)(1) (similar rulemaking authority for the EPA under the Safe Drinking
Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6912(a) (similar rulemaking authority for the EPA under RCRA); 42 U.S.C. §
7601(a)(1) (similar authority for the EPA under the Clean Air Act). It is not unusual for a President to
ask agencies to halt all rulemaking activities for a short period of time when the President initially takes
office, especially if the prior President was a member of an opposing political party. See, e.g.,
Memorandum from Reince Priebus, Chief of Staff, for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies,
(Jan.
20,
2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/20/memorandum-heads-executive-departments-a
nd-agencies (last visited June 21, 2017) (instructing agencies to send no regulation to the Federal
Register until a department or agency head appointed by President Trump reviewed and approved the
regulation) [hereinafter “Priebus Transition Memo”]; Memorandum from Rahm Emanuel, Assistant to
the President and Chief of Staff, the White House, to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
(Jan. 20, 2009), in 74 Fed. Reg. 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009) (instructing agencies to not start or finish any
regulations without approval of the new Administration of President Obama). See also O’Connell,
Agency Rulemaking, supra note 54, at 529. The rulemaking process tends to slow down considerably at
the beginning of Presidential administrations, especially for rules for which the rulemaking process
began during the prior administration. In a study of rulemakings between 1983 and 2010, Professor
Anne O’Connell found that “rulemakings during which a Presidential transition occurred after the
[notice of proposed rulemaking] was issued took, on average, nearly three times as long to complete as
those . . . that started and ended during a single administration.” See O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking,
supra note 54, at 514.
89. See O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking, supra note 54, at 477-478. The number of rulemakings
that are withdrawn tends to increase at the beginning of new Presidential administrations. Id. at 509.
When Presidents encourage agencies to withdraw rules that have been not finalized, they generally
exclude, from that directive, rules that the agencies are required to finalize by law. Id. at 529.
90. See, supra Parts I and II.
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Order that directs the agency to not adopt particular rules or which
makes the rulemaking process particularly difficult.91 President Trump’s
“two for one” Executive Order is a good example of that tactic. On
January 30, 2017, the President issued Executive Order 13,771,92 which
requires agencies to repeal two existing regulations for every new
regulation that they propose.93 In addition, the costs imposed by the new
regulation on the economy must be offset by the costs of existing
regulations that will be repealed if the new regulation is adopted.94
Furthermore, the Order requires agencies to provide more advance
notice before commencing the rulemaking process.95 The net effect of
the Executive Order will likely be the suppression of most new
rulemaking by agencies.
However, the President’s power to act by Executive Order is limited,
and the President cannot change federal law or require agencies to
violate federal law through an Executive Order.96 Many of the federal
91. While there is no explicit Constitutional or statutory authority for Executive Orders, they are
an exercise of the President’s Article II Executive power and direct the actions of executive agencies or
government officials and set policies for the Executive Branch. See John C. Duncan, Jr., A Critical
Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV.
333, 334 (2010) . See also Vivian S. Chu & Todd Garvey, Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification
and Revocation, Cong. Res. Serv. Rept. # RS20846, Apr. 16, 2014, at 2,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20846.pdf (last visited June 21, 2017); Staff of House Comm. on
Government Operations, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Executive Orders and Proclamations: A Study of a Use
of Presidential Powers (Comm. Print 1957). President Trump’s focus on the Executive Order as a tool
for quick Executive action is not unusual. President Clinton and President George W. Bush issued more
Executive Orders during their first years in office than in all of the other years that they were in office.
See O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking, supra note 54, at 496-498.
92. See Executive Order 13,771 of January 30, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/02/03/2017-02451/reducing-regulation-and-controlling
-regulatory-costs (last visited June 21, 2017). OMB Guidance suggests that the reach of the Order may
be even broader, in that the Guidance defines “regulatory actions” and “deregulatory actions” subject to
the Order to include “significant guidance documents.” See Office of Management and Budget, Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Guidance Implementing Executive Order 13,771, Titled
“Reducing
Regulation
and
Controlling
Regulatory
Costs”,
Apr.
5,
2017,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/05/memorandum-implementing-executive-order13771-titled-reducing-regulation (last visited June 21, 2017) [hereinafter “OIRA Guidance on Executive
Order 13,771”].
93. Id. §2(a). The Order recognizes that agencies will have to utilize notice and comment
rulemaking procedures to repeal those rules. Id. §2(c).
94. Id. §2(c). The Order does not authorize agencies to consider the value of benefits that will be
lost when existing regulations are repealed in calculating the costs imposed on the economy. It does not
refer to “benefits” of regulations or to “net costs” of regulations, but simply to costs. Id.
95. Id. § 3. Agencies are not allowed to issue rules that were not previously included in the
Unified Regulatory Agenda for the agency. Id.
96. See Chu & Garvey, supra note 91, at 1 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 638 (1952); Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1332-1339 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Indeed, the Executive Order explicitly limits its reach, indicating in Section 2(a) that agencies must
identify two regulations to be repealed when proposing a new regulation “unless prohibited by law” and
in Section 2(c) that agencies shall offset the costs of the new regulation “to the extent permitted by law”
by the elimination of existing costs associated with at least two prior regulations. See Exec. Order No.
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environmental laws require the EPA to adopt regulations addressing
particular issues and to review or revise those regulations on a periodic
basis.97 In addition, the APA authorizes any person to petition an agency
to issue, amend, or repeal regulations, and several of the environmental
laws explicitly authorize citizens to petition agencies to make, amend, or
repeal rules, so agencies may be forced to adopt rules or explain in a
rational manner why they are not going to adopt rules in response to
citizen petitions.98 Agencies that do not adopt rules required by law or
that fail to respond to citizen petitions for rulemaking in rational ways
will likely face lawsuits.99 Accordingly, the Executive Order will not
completely stop the EPA or other agencies from adopting rules. The
Executive Order authorizes agencies to adopt rules required by law
without simultaneously complying with the offset requirements of the
Order, but the OMB guidance on the order makes it clear that agencies
are expected to offset the costs of the new rule with appropriate repeals
of other rules “as soon as practicable thereafter.”100 Thus, the Executive
Order could have a longer-term deregulatory impact by forcing an
agency to repeal existing rules in order to adopt new rules that are
required by law.
Ultimately, however, the President’s power to prevent the EPA and
other agencies from adopting new rules through intimidation or
Executive Order is a weak tool to deconstruct the administrative state
13,771, supra note 92, §§ 2(a) & (c). In addition, the Executive Order provides that “Nothing in this
order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect: (i) the authority granted by law to an executive
department or agency, or the head thereof . . . .”, id. §5(a), and “This order shall be implemented
consistent with applicable law . . . .” Id. §5(b).
97. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (2012) (requiring the EPA to annually revise effluent
guidelines under the Clean Water Act if appropriate); 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b) (2012) (requiring the EPA to
revise pretreatment standards under the Clean Water Act from time to time); 33 U.S.C. § 1345(d) (2012)
(requiring the EPA to review the Clean Water Act sewage sludge regulations at least every two years for
the purpose of identifying additional toxic pollutants to be regulated); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b) (2012)
(requiring the EPA to review and, if appropriate, revise national primary drinking water standards under
the Safe Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) (2012) (requiring the EPA to review Clean Air Act
national air quality standards every five years and revise them as appropriate); 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)
(2012) (requiring the EPA to review and, if appropriate, revise the Clean Air Act new source
performance standards every eight years); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2012) (requiring the EPA to review and
revise, as necessary, the Clean Air Act hazardous air pollutant standards every eight years); 42 U.S.C. §
6921 (2012) (requiring the EPA to revise the RCRA hazardous waste criteria and regulations from time
to time as appropriate); 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (2012) (requiring the EPA to revise the Superfund National
Priority List at least annually).
98. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012). In addition, the Endangered Species Act authorizes any person
to petition the Department of Interior to undertake a rulemaking to list a species as threatened or
endangered and requires the agency to make a finding on that petition within 12 months. See 16 U.S.C.
§1533(b)(3) (2012). RCRA also includes explicit authority for persons to petition the agency for
rulemaking. See 42 U.S.C. § 6974 (2012).
99. The citizen suit provisions of the federal environmental laws generally authorize persons to
sue agencies when they fail to undertake non-discretionary duties. See supra note 45.
100. See OIRA Guidance on Executive Order 13,771, supra note 92, Part VI, Q 33.
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because it will only last as long as the President is in office. A
subsequent Administration could easily repeal Executive Orders limiting
rulemaking and could encourage agencies to greatly expand their
rulemaking efforts.101
Another limited power that the President has to restrict agency
rulemaking is the power to delay rules that were finalized at the end of a
preceding Administration. Much ink has been spilled regarding the
“midnight rulemaking” that occurs at the end of a Presidential
Administration.102 Most Presidents act quickly upon inauguration to
seek to delay the effective dates of regulations that were finalized by the
prior Administration, but have not yet taken effect when the new
President has taken office.103
President Trump took this action shortly after he took office when he
ordered agencies to postpone, by 60 days, the effective date of all
regulations that had been published in the Federal Register, but had not
yet taken effect. The directive delayed the implementation of at least 30
environmental rules.104 The purpose of the postponement was to review
“questions of fact, law, and policy they raise.”105 The President’s memo
to executive agencies and departments also indicated that agencies
should, where appropriate and as permitted by applicable law, consider
proposing for notice and comment a delay of the effective date of
regulations beyond the sixty-day period.106
Once an agency has adopted a final rule, the agency can only change
the rule through a subsequent notice and comment rulemaking.107 When

101. There are very few procedures that Presidents must follow when issuing or repealing an
Executive Order. See Chu & Garvey, supra note 91, at 7; Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90
IOWA L. REV. 539, 552-553 (2005). The Administrative Procedures Act does not apply to actions of the
President, since the President is not an “agency” under the law. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(2012). The only
procedural requirements that the President must follow are imposed by the Federal Register Act, which
requires that Executive Orders must be published in the Federal Register, see 44 U.S.C. § 1505 (2012),
and by an Executive Order issued by President Kennedy, see Exec. Order No. 11,030, 27 Fed. Reg.
5847 (1962), codified 1 C.F.R. Part 19.
102. See O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking, supra note 54, at 472-473 (discussing the phenomena
and noting that the number of rulemakings finalized at the end of a Presidential administration increases
even when the new President is a member of the same political party as the outgoing President); See
Jack M. Beerman, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 948-954 (2003) (citing a
study that noted that regulatory output usually increases by 27.4% in the last three months of an
administration).
103. See O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking, supra note 54, at 471-473 (describing the actions of
President Obama and President George W. Bush, among others); Beerman, supra note 102, at 949-950
(describing the actions of President George W. Bush). The President cannot, however, suspend rules that
have already taken effect without following the normal notice and comment procedures. See infra notes
188-190, and accompanying text.
104. See Biesecker & Flesher, supra note 65.
105. See Priebus Transition Memo, supra note 88, § 3.
106. Id.
107. See Beerman, supra note 102, at 982-983 (2003).
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an agency delays the effective date of a rule that has been finalized,
therefore, it could face legal challenges.108 A President can probably
justify a temporary delay of the effective date of a rule that has been
finalized without going through traditional notice and comment
rulemaking109 by relying on the “good cause” exception in the APA,
which allows agencies to bypass the notice and comment procedures
required for rulemaking when the agency “for good cause finds ... that
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest.”110 That exception, however, is a very
limited exception,111 and would not likely justify delay of the effective
dates of rules for a more substantial period of time.112 Alternatively, the
Executive Branch might argue that the delay is justified by Section
10(d) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 705, which authorizes an agency, “when
justice so requires,” to postpone the effective date of agency actions,
pending judicial review.113 In order to justify delay under Section 705,
108. See O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking, supra note 54, at 530. As Professor Jack Beerman notes,
however, most challenges to such delays in the effective dates of rules would be moot by the time they
could be raised in court. See Beerman, supra note 102, at 983.
109. See O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking, supra note 54, at 530 (discussing President Obama’s
limited suspension of the effective dates of rules); Beerman, supra note 102, at 983, 988 (discussing
President George W. Bush’s limited suspension of the effective dates of rules).
110. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2012). Agencies are required to provide a statement that
supports their findings that good cause justifies the avoidance of the notice and comment procedures. Id.
President George W. Bush relied on that exception to justify delaying the effective date of regulations
for sixty days when he took office. See Beerman, supra note 102, at 983. See also William M. Jack,
Comment, Taking Care That Presidential Oversight of the Regulatory Process is Faithfully Executed: A
Review of Rule Withdrawals and Rule Suspensions under the Bush Administration’s Card
Memorandum, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1479, 1505-1511 (200). Professor Jack Beerman argues that the
President’s constitutional authority to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” should justify a
brief delay in the effective date of rules to allow a newly appointed President time to review the rules.
See Beerman, supra note 102, at 993-994. He also argues that courts would likely find such a limited
delay without notice and comment to review rules within agencies’ power at the outset of a new
Administration. Id.
111. See Michael A. Rosenhouse, Construction and Application of Good Cause Exception to
Notice and Comment Rulemaking Under Admnistrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B), 26
A.L.R. Fed. 2d § 2, at 97 (2008). The exception is narrowly construed and the agency has the burden of
demonstrating good cause to the court. Id. Courts have generally found notice and comment to be
“unnecessary” under the exception when changes proposed by the agency are minor or technical. Id.
While a temporary delay in the effective date for a rule may be minor, more substantial delays are
unlikely to be considered by courts to be minor.
112. See Beerman, supra note 102, at 983. See also Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d
179, 204–06 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the Department of Energy’s indefinite suspension of the
effective date of a rule violated APA notice and comment requirements).
113. See 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2012). Section 705 “permits an agency to pospone the effective date of
a not yet effective rule, pending judicial review.” Safety-Kleen Corp. v. EPA, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
2324 *2-3 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam). The Trump Administration attempted to rely on Section 705
to justify postponement of Interior Department rules governing the valuation of oil and gas and coal on
federal lands 53 days AFTER the rules took effect. See 82 Fed. Reg. 11,823 (Feb. 27, 2017). However,
the D.C. Circuit, in the Safety-Kleen case, has explicitly held that Section 705 “does not permit [an]
agency to suspend without notice and comment a promulgated rule.” See Safety-Kleen, supra, at *3.
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however, an agency must satisfy the four-part test that applies to a
request for a preliminary injunction.114
Regardless of which approach the Executive Branch relies upon, to
the extent that the President asserts that the delay is necessary to review
the fact, law, and policy questions raised by rules, the White House
should be able to conclude that review within sixty days. If, after that
time, agencies feel that they need more time to review the regulations,
they should conduct notice and comment rulemaking to delay the
effective date.115 Similarly, if they conclude that the regulations that
were finalized by the prior Administration should be repealed or
modified, they need to begin the notice and comment process to repeal
or modify them.116
In light of all of those restrictions, the President’s power to
temporarily delay the effective date of rules is an even weaker tool to
deconstruct the administrative state than the President’s power to halt or
slow the adoption of new regulations while the President is in office.
B. Congress’ Power to Limit the Adoption of New Rules
Congress, like the President, may take steps to slow or stop agency
rulemaking as a means of deconstructing the administrative state. While
the 115th Congress has not enacted laws to eliminate agencies or
significantly reduce their powers, they have introduced several bills that,
if enacted, could create serious impediments to agency rulemaking.
Unlike the Executive Orders and policies of a President, however, the
restrictions would have long lasting impact on agencies, because they
would be codified as law and would apply beyond the current
Administration.
For instance, the Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017 was
introduced in the House and Senate early in the 115th Congress.117
Although the House and Senate versions were not identical, each
114. See Sierra Club v. Jackson, 833 F. Supp. 2d 11, 30 (D.D.C. 2012). Under that test, the
proponent of an injunction “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor,
and that an injunction is in the public interest.” See Winter v. N.R.D.C., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
115. See Beerman, supra note 102, at 983, n. 120. During the Bush Administration, the EPA
engaged in notice and comment rulemaking when it extended an initial delay in the effective date of
rules addressing arsenic levels in drinking water by nine months, to provide the agency more time to
review the rule. Id. Professor Beerman suggests that courts might view longer delays in the effective
dates of regulations to be a “cover for repeal without notice and comment.” See Beerman, supra note
102, at 994.
116. See infra notes 188-190, and accompanying text.
117. See
H.R.
5,
115th
Cong.,
1st
Sess.
(2017),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5 (last visited June 21, 2017); S. 951, 115th
Cong., 1st. Sess. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/951 (last visited June
21, 2017).
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version would increase the circumstances in which agencies need to
adopt rules through a more formal trial-type hearing process,118 increase
the information that agencies need to collect and consider in developing
rules and disclose to the public during the rulemaking process,119
increase the factors that agencies must consider when adopting rules,120
and limit the communications that agencies can make during the notice
and comment process to solicit input on proposed rules.121 In addition,
both bills would eliminate the deference that courts accord to agencies
when agencies interpret their own rules,122 and the House bill would also
eliminate the deference that courts accord to agencies under Chevron v.
N.R.D.C.123 when agencies are interpreting statutes that they are charged
with administering.124
118. The House bill requires agencies to hold formal hearings for “high impact rules” unless all
participants in the rulemaking waive the hearing requirement and requires agencies to hold formal
hearings for “major rules” whenever a person petitions the agency to hold formal hearings “unless the
agency reasonably determines that a hearing would not advance consideration of the rule or would
unreasonably delay completion of the rulemaking.” See H.R. 5, supra note 117, §§ 103, 105. The Senate
bill requires agencies to create a docket and follow more formal procedures than are required under the
APA for notice and comment rulemaking when issuing “major rules” and “high impact rules”, and
authorizes any person to petition the agency for a trial type formal hearing before an administrative law
judge for “major rules” or “high impact rules”. See S. 951, supra note 117, §3.
119. The House bill requires the agency to consider “any reasonable alternatives to the rule”,
including a “no rule” alternative, when adopting a rule and requires the agency to include, in a docket
for the rule, all information considered by the agency in connection with its adoption of the rule, and
requires the agency to identify, in the rule, “an achievable objective for the rule and metrics for
measurement.” See H.R. 5, supra note 117, § 103. The Senate bill requires agencies to consider at least
three alternatives to a proposed rule in all rulemakings, to explain, for “major rules” and “high impact
rules” why they did not propose those alternatives, and “publish all studies, models, scientific literature,
and other information developed or relied upon by the agency, and actions taken by the agency to obtain
that information.” See S. 951, supra note 117, §3.
120. The House bill requires agencies to consider the costs and benefits of all rules,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, and requires agencies to adopt the “least costly rule . . . that
meets the relevant statutory objectives.” See H.R. 5, supra note 117, §103. The Senate bill requires
agencies to consider the costs and benefits of “high impact rules” and “major rules” and to adopt “the
most cost effective rule of the alternatives considered that meets the statutory objectives.” See S. 951,
supra note 117, §3.
121. See H.R. 5, supra note 117, § 103; S. 951, supra note 117, §3.
122. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (holding that an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation is entitled to of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation).
123. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (Courts defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of statutes when
the statute is ambiguous).
124. The House bill replaces Chevron and Auer deference with de novo review by courts of
agency interpretations of law and regulations. See H.R. 5, supra note 117, §202. The Senate bill replaces
Auer deference for agency interpretations of agency regulations with the deference accorded to agencies
under Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944), but does not change the level of deference courts accord
to agency interpretations of statutes that they are charged with administering. See S. 951, supra note
117, §4. In Skidmore, the Supreme Court held that when determining whether to defer to agency’s
decisions, courts should consider the thoroughness of the agency’s consideration, the formality of
procedures used by the agency, the validity of the agency’s reasoning, the consistency of the agency’s
interpretation, whether the interpretation is longstanding or contemporaneous, and the agency’s level of
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Another bill that passed the House and is pending in the Senate, the
Regulatory Integrity Act of 2017,125 would require agencies to create a
docket for regulatory actions (including the issuance of guidance
documents, policy statements, directives, and adjudication, as well as
rulemaking)126 and to include, in the docket, every public
communication (including written or verbal statements, blog posts,
videos, audio recordings, and other social media messages)127 about the
action issued by the agency,128 within 24 hours after the communication
takes place.129
Both of those laws would severely slow, or even stop, agency
rulemaking by imposing onerous, time-consuming, and resourceintensive requirements on the process.130 Another legislative proposal,
the Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017
(“REINS Act”), takes a more direct approach to stop agency
rulemaking.131 Under the bill, any “major” rule adopted by an agency
would need to be approved by a joint resolution of Congress before it
takes effect.132
While Congress, therefore, has more power than the President to slow
or halt agency rulemaking in the long term, none of the proposed bills
have passed both houses thus far.133 It is likely that the threat of a
expertise on the issue, among other factors. See See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In
Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1281 (2007).
125. See
H.R.
1004,
115th
Cong.,
1st
Sess.
(2017),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1004 (last visited June 21, 2017).
126. Id. § 307(a)(1).
127. Id. § 307(a)(2).
128. Id. §307(b)(1)(B).
129. Id. § 307(b)(2). The bill also includes prohibitions on agency solicitation of public input
during rulemaking that are similar to those in the Regulatory Accountability Act. Id. §307(c).
130. See William Funk, Requiring Formal Rulemaking Is a Thinly Veiled Attempt to Halt
Regulation,
The
Regulatory
Review,
May
18,
2017,
https://www.theregreview.org/2017/05/18/funk-formal-rulemaking-halt-regulation/ (last visited June 21,
2017) (arguing that the judicial, trial-like procedures of formal rulemaking are fundamentally at odds
with the nature of the legislative decision-making process that epitomizes rulemaking and asserting that
the proposal is designed to increase the cost of rulemaking and retard regulatory, but not deregulatory,
efforts); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Good Effort, With One Glaring Flaw, The Regulatory Review, May 8,
2017, https://www.theregreview.org/2017/05/08/pierce-good-effort-glaring-flaw/ (last visited June 21,
2017) (also noting that the judicial type formal hearing procedures included in the proposed legislation
are useful for the determination of adjudicative facts, but serve no purpose when agencies are finding
legislative facts in rulemaking proceedings). See also Daniel E. Walters, Ditch the Flawed Legislative
Proposal to Police Agency Communications, The Regulatory Review, May 10, 2017,
https://www.theregreview.org/2017/05/10/walters-proposal-agency-communications/ (last visited June
21, 2017) (criticizing the communications prohibitions in the Regulatory Accountability Act, which are
similar to the prohibitions in the Regulatory Integrity Act).
131. H.R.
26,
115th
Cong.,
1st
Sess.
(2017),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/26 (last visited June 21, 2017).
132. Id. §§ 801-802.
133. However, all of the bills passed the House and several were reported out of committee in the
Senate. See U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Senate Homeland
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filibuster in the Senate, and the corresponding requirement for a
supermajority to enact legislation, has prevented Congress from
adopting broader provisions to derail environmental and other
regulation. Even if Congress succeeds in enacting legislation that
imposes additional burdens on agency rulemaking, it will have
succeeded because it adopted limits on agency rulemaking that were
largely unnoticed by the general public, rather than because it mounted a
direct assault on environmental rules and the administrative state.
IV. THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS TO REPEAL OR REVISE
EXISTING RULES
A. Congress’ Power to Revise or Repeal Existing Rules
Congress and the President can also take steps to deconstruct the
administrative state by repealing or weakening existing environmental
regulations. At the beginning of the Trump Administration, Congress
was able to revoke several environmental rules that were adopted by the
EPA at the end of President Obama’s Administration; however,
Congress was only successful in revoking these rules because it used a
streamlined legislative process that limited transparency and debate on
the legislative activity.
The Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) was enacted in 1996134 as a
tool to provide Congress with more control over administrative agency
rulemaking after the Supreme Court invalidated the “legislative veto”
process that Congress had routinely included in agency legislation as a
check on rulemaking.135 The CRA requires agencies to notify Congress
when they adopt “major rules,”136 and the Act delays the effective date
of those rules for sixty days to allow Congress to review the rules and to
decide whether to take action to overturn the rules.137 If Congress
Security Committee Approves 17 Bills Including, Boots on the Border, Regulatory Reform and the Fair
Chance
Act,
May
17,
2017,
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/senate-homeland-security-committee-approves-17bills-including-boots-on-the-border-regulatory-reform-and-the-fair-chance-act (last visited June 21,
2017).
134. Congressional Review Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, subtit. E, 110 Stat. 868-74
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2012)).
135. See The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162, 2165 (2009).
The “legislative veto” process, which the Supreme Court invalidated in Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), allowed one or both chambers of Congress to “veto” agency
rules through a resolution of the chamber, without presentment to the President.
136. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A) (2012). A “major rule” is a rule with an annual effect of $100
million or more on the economy, a major impact on prices, or other significant adverse effects on the
economy. Id. § 804(2).
137. Id. §801(a)(3).
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objects to a rule adopted by the agency, the CRA creates a streamlined
legislative process that Congress can use to revoke the agency’s rule
through a joint resolution of disapproval.138 The CRA also includes
several features limiting the ability of a Congressional minority to block
the resolution of disapproval.139 Significantly, the Act prohibits the use
of filibuster in the Senate,140 limits the power of any party to keep the
resolution in committees,141 and prohibits amendments and limits debate
on the Senate floor.142 The net effect of those procedures is to reduce the
transparency of the process and to reduce deliberation on the legislation.
Ultimately, if the joint resolution is passed by both houses of Congress
and signed by the President, the agency’s rule is revoked and, per the
legislation, the agency may not adopt a new rule that is substantially
similar to the revoked rule unless Congress passes a new law
authorizing the agency to do so.143 The Act is limited, however, in that it
only allows Congress to revoke, and not to modify, a rule through the
streamlined procedures.144 Thus, if a majority of Congress supports part
of the rule, but oppose other parts, they cannot simply revoke the portion
that they do not support.
Between 1996 and 2017, the CRA was only successfully used one
time to overturn an agency regulation.145 In the past, the President’s
power to veto Congressional resolutions to overturn Executive Branch
rules frequently prevented Congress from successfully using the Act.146
However, with the election of President Trump, the same political party
controlled the House and the Senate, and Congress and the new
President were united in opposition to several rules adopted by the
outgoing Administration.147 The election, thus, created the perfect storm
138. Id.
139. See The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162, 2176-2177
(2009).
140. See 5 U.S.C. §802(d) (2012).
141. If a committee has not reported out a disapproval resolution within 20 days after a “major
rule” is submitted to Congress, as few as 30 Senators can bring the resolution to the Senate floor by a
petition. See 5 U.S.C. §802(c) (2012). In addition, when a disapproval resolution is sent from the House
to the Senate or from the Senate to the House, it cannot be referred to a committee in the receiving
chamber. Id. §802(f)(1).
142. Id. §802(d). The law limits debate on the resolution to 10 hours, equally divided between
supporters and opponents. Id.
143. Id. §801(b).
144. Id. § 802(a). Since the resolution that passes each chamber will be identical, there is also no
conference report for the resolution. See 142 Cong. Rec. 8199 (1996) (statement of Sens. Nickles, Reid
and Stevens).
145. See 122 HARV. L. REV. at 2169.
146. See Chelsea Harvey, Republicans Can Cancel Some Obama Environment Rules. But They’ll
Have to Choose Carefully, WASH. POST, Jan. 4., 2017, http://tiny.cc/oi4yly (last visited June 21, 2017).
147. Id. See also Michael Grunwald, Trump’s Secret Weapon Against Obama’s Legacy, Politico,
Apr. 10, 2017, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/04/donald-trump-obama-legacy-215009
(last visited June 21, 2017).
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for the use of the CRA.148
Within the first few months after President Trump’s inauguration,
Congress successfully passed, and the President signed, 13 joint
resolutions revoking rules under the CRA.149 Several of the resolutions
targeted environmental rules, including a “stream protection” rule from
the DOI designed to protect water quality from coal mining pollution;150
a land use planning rule from the DOI designed to increase public
involvement in, transparency of, and efficiency of, planning for uses of
public lands;151 and a rule from the DOI that addressed protection of
endangered and threatened species on National Wildlife Refuges in
Alaska.152
Critics of the CRA complain that the law allows Congress to revoke
rules that have been developed after years of work by agencies
involving significant opportunities for public participation and full
consideration of a wide range of input through resolutions that are
prompted by affluent corporate donors and are enacted with no hearings
and little public debate.153 During the first few months of 2017, the 13
rules that were targeted for revocation under the Congressional Review
Act took an average of three years to complete, while the revocation
legislation for the rules that were successfully revoked under the law
generally took about 38 days to complete.154 The Stream Protection Rule
that Congress revoked with legislation that passed in 3 days was
designed to update rules that had not been amended in thirty years and
the rule was adopted after seven years of development by the agency
and the consideration of more than 95,000 public comments over a 102148. See Harvey, supra note 146, Grunwald, supra note 147. See also Center for Progressive
Reform, CRA By the Numbers, http://www.progressivereform.org/CRA_numbers.cfm (last visited June
21, 2017).
149. See Center for Progressive Reform, supra note 148. By early April, the 11 disapproval
resolutions that the President had signed into law were “the only substantive bills” he had signed at that
time. See Grunwald, supra note 147. The only disapproval resolution that did not pass both chambers of
Congress was a resolution that would have repealed a rule limiting methane emissions from drilling
operations on public lands. See Juliet Eilperin & Chelsea Harvey, Senate Unexpectedly Rejects Bid to
Repeal a Key Obama-era Environmental Regulation, WASH. POST, May 10, 2017, http://tiny.cc/2i4yly
(last visited June 21, 2017). The resolution was rejected in the Senate by a vote of 51-49. Id. That
environmental victory is likely to be short-lived, though, as the new Administration has identified the
rule as a rule that the agency plans to repeal. Id.
150. See Pub. L. No. 115-5, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017).
151. See Pub. L. No. 115-12, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017).
152. See Pub. L. No. 115-20, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017).
153. See Center for Progressive Reform, supra note 148. The Center for Progressive Reform notes
that “financial disclosure data reveal that the lead sponsors of [the] CRA resolutions have received
significant campaign contributions from the . . . industries that would most directly benefit from the
regulatory rollbacks that the resolutions would accomplish.” Id. Similarly, a January 2017 report by
Public Citizen found that industries supporting CRA legislation spent more than $800 million lobbying
Congress during 2016. See Grunwald, supra note 147.
154. Id.
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day comment period.155
Critics also complain that the revoked rules were generally authorized
by legislation that was enacted with broad bi-partisan support and that
Congress was using “back door” procedures156 to revoke the rules
because it would not be possible to revoke them through a transparent
deliberative process where the public was fully aware of what Congress
was doing.157
Although Congress successfully used the CRA to revoke 13 agency
rules adopted in the last few months of 2016, the reach of the law is
ultimately limited. As noted above, it only authorizes Congress to use
the streamlined process to revoke a rule for a limited period of time after
the rule has been adopted.158 The time period for Congress to act and to
revoke rules adopted during the last Presidential Administration expired
in May 2017.159 If Congress passes any more resolutions under the CRA
during the next four years, they will be resolutions to overturn rules
adopted by the new Administration, so the President will likely be
willing to veto the resolutions. Congress is, however, attempting to
increase its power under the CRA by proposing legislation, the Midnight
Rules Relief Act of 2017,160 that would allow Congress to reach back
further in time to revoke agency rules and to revoke multiple agency
155. See 81 Fed. Reg. 93,066 (Dec. 20, 2016). The agency’s economic analysis of the rule
suggested that it would lead to an increase in 156 full time jobs and a decrease in coal production by
.08% per year. Id. The land use planning rule that Congress revoked with legislation that passed in about
two months was also designed to update rules that had not been amended in thirty years and the rule was
adopted after two years of development by the agency and the consideration of thousands of public
comments over a 100 day comment period. See 81 Fed. Reg. 89,580 (Dec. 12, 2016).
156. See Grunwald, supra note 147.
157. See Center for Progressive Reform, supra note 148. The Center for Progressive Reform notes
that “the margins for passage of the underlying statutes for the rules targeted under the CRA in the
House and Senate were 245 and 65, while the margins for passing the CRA resolutions were 49 and 6.”
Id. As Michael Grunwald reported, most of the regulations that were revoked under the CRA “were
uncontroversial with the public but bitterly opposed by corporate interests . . . .” See Grunwald, supra
note 147.
158. A disapproval resolution must be submitted in the House or Senate within 60 days after
Congress receives the rule for Congress in order for Congress to consider the resolution under the
streamlined provisions of the CRA. See 5 U.S.C. §802(a) (2012). For rules that are submitted to
Congress during the final sixty days of a Congressional session (which also corresponds, occasionally,
to the end of a Presidential Administration), disapproval resolutions may be submitted within 75
legislative days after the next session of Congress convenes. Id. § 801(d)(1). As long as the process
begins within the time provided by the CRA, Congress can pass a joint resolution that revokes a rule
that has already taken effect. See Richard S. Beth, Disapproval of Regulations by Congress, Procedure
under the Congressional Review Act, Cong. Res. Serv. No. 7-5700, Oct. 10, 2001,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl31160.pdf (last visited June 21, 2017). If Congress enacts a
resolution disapproving a rule that has already taken effect, the rule “shall be treated as though [it] had
never taken effect.” See 5 U.S.C. §801(f) (2012).
159. See Stephen Dinan, GOP Rolled Back 14 of 15 Obama Rules Using Congressional Review
Act, WASH. TIMES, May 15, 2017, http://tiny.cc/ej4yly (last visited June 21, 2017).
160. See
H.R.
21,
115th
Cong.,
1st
Sess.
(2017),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/21 (last visited June 21, 2017).
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rules in a single joint resolution.161 Under the existing CRA, Congress
must pass a separate joint resolution to revoke each rule that it intends to
revoke.162 While the proposed legislation would increase Congressional
control over agency rulemaking, it must be adopted through the normal
legislative process, which subjects it to filibuster and control through
committees and other procedural maneuvers. So far, the Midnight Rules
Relief Act remains merely a proposal languishing in the Senate.
B. The President’s Power to Revise or Repeal Existing Regulations
While the President does not generally have direct authority to revise
or repeal existing regulations, the President can use the Appointment
Power, Budget Power, and other Executive authorities to encourage
agencies to revise or repeal regulations.163 The President can do that
informally through conversations and communications with agency
leaders or more formally through means such as an Executive Order.
Since his inauguration, President Trump has issued an Executive Order
that very broadly requires agencies to review and potentially revise or
repeal existing regulations164 and additional Executive Orders that target
specific regulations or actions that the President would like to see
revised or repealed.165
1. Executive Order 13,777
About one month after his inauguration, President Trump signed
Executive Order 13,777 to “alleviate unnecessary regulatory burdens
placed on the American people.”166 The Order requires each agency to
161. Id. §2(a).
162. See 5 U.S.C. §802(a) (2012).
163. See Beerman, supra note 102, at 983, 1000-1001.
164. See Executive Order 13,777, Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285
(March
1,
2017),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/03/01/2017-04107/enforcing-the-regulatory-reform-ag
enda (last visited June 21, 2017).
165. See Executive Order 13,778, Presidential Executive Order on Restoring the Rule of Law,
Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing the "Waters of the United States" Rule, 82 Fed. Reg.
12,497
(Feb.
28,
2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/28/presidential-executive-order-restoring-rule-la
w-federalism-and-economic (last visited June 21, 2017); Executive Order 13,783, Presidential
Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar.
31,
2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/28/presidential-executive-order-promoting-energ
y-independence-and-economi-1 (last visited June 21, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,792 of April 26, 2017,
Review of Designations Under the Antiquities Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 20429 (Apr. 26, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/26/presidential-executive-order-review-designatio
ns-under-antiquities-act (last visited June 21, 2017).
166. See Exec. Order 13,777, supra note 164, §1.
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appoint a Regulatory Reform Officer for the agency167 and to create a
Regulatory Reform Task Force to evaluate existing regulations and to
make recommendations regarding the repeal, replacement, or
modification of regulations.168 In particular, the Order requires agencies
to identify regulations that “eliminate jobs, or inhibit job creation” or
“impose costs that exceed benefits.”169 The Order requires each task
force to seek input from entities significantly affected by federal
regulations and, within 90 days, to prepare a report for the agency head
identifying the regulations for repeal, replacement, or modification.170
In concept, the Order issued by the President is not unusual. Every
President since President Carter has required agencies to review existing
regulations against specific criteria articulated by the President to decide
whether to revise or repeal regulations.171 In addition, the Regulatory
Flexibility Act requires agencies to review regulations that have a
significant impact on small businesses even ten years.172 Even without
the impetus of those formal review requirements, agencies are
constantly re-examining their regulations to determine whether they
need to be repealed, replaced, or modified.173 When not prompted by
Executive Orders or formal review requirements, agencies generally
revise, repeal, or modify their rules in response to pressure from
regulated entities.174
While the concept of the Executive Order is not novel, the President
and Executive agencies appear to be pursuing the review process much
more vigorously than prior Administrations.175 Within a month after the
President Trump issued the Executive Order, EPA Administrator Scott
Pruitt appointed the agency’s Regulatory Reform Officer and
Regulatory Reform Task Force176 and, on April 13, 2017, posted a
167. Id. §2.
168. Id. §3.
169. Id. The Order also requires agencies to identify regulations that “are outdated, unnecessary,
or ineffective” or “create serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with regulatory reform initiatives
and policies.” Id.
170. Id.
171. See Wagner, et. al, supra note 54, at 186; Beerman, supra note 102, at 948, 982.
172. See 5 U.S.C. §610(b) (2012).
173. See Wagner, et al., supra note 54, at 190. Professors Wagner and her associates reviewed
183 rules across three agencies over a forty year period and found that 73% of the rules were revised at
least once and often multiple times over the study period. Id. at 201-202. They also found that only
about 1% of the rule revisions resulted from formal retrospective review required by an Executive Order
or statute. Id. at 217.
174. Id. at 228. The study conducted by Professors Wagner and her associates found that
regulated industries were among the most important motivators for rule adjustments, and that industries
prompted revisions through petitions, informal communications with agencies and threats of litigation.
Id.
175. See Dennis, EPA Asked the Public About Which Regulations to Gut, supra note 22.
176. See Memorandum from E. Scott Pruitt to Acting Deputy Administrator, General Counsel,
Assistant Administrators, Inspector General, Chief Financial Officer, Chief of Staff, Associate
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notice in the Federal Register seeking public comments regarding
“regulations that may be appropriate for repeal, replacement or
modification.”177 As noted earlier, the broad public support for
environmental protection was demonstrated by the hundreds of
thousands of comments that were submitted to the agency, urging the
agency to not repeal, replace, or modify any of the environmental
regulations.178
On its face, the charge of the Executive Order seems reasonable and
moderate. However, public statements from the President and agency
officials suggest that the process, coupled with the deregulatory
requirements of Executive Order 13,771, will lead to significant
deregulatory activity by agencies.179 If implementation of the Executive
Order leads to significant deregulatory activity in the environmental
arena, it should be troubling, since Executive Orders from Presidents of
both parties have consistently required agencies, for decades, to conduct
cost benefit analyses for proposed rules and to refrain from adopting
rules when the benefits do not justify the costs.180 Consequently, unless
the costs of an existing regulation are considerably higher than initially
projected or the benefits achieved by the regulation are considerably
lower than expected, most rules should not fail a retrospective cost
benefit review.181 Indeed, it is frequently the case that retrospective
review demonstrates that cost benefit analyses overestimated the costs
or underestimated the benefits of proposed rules.182 In addition, any
Administrators, Regional Administrators, Director, Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business
Utilization, Regarding Executive Order 13777: Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda, Mar. 24,
2017, https://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/04/04/document_gw_01.pdf (last visited June 21, 2017).
177. See 82 Fed. Reg. 17,793 (Apr. 13, 2017).
178. See supra note 22.
179. See, e.g., Robinson Meyer, How the U.S. Protects the Environment, From Nixon to Trump,
The
Atlantic,
Mar.
29,
2017,
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/how-the-epa-and-us-environmental-law-works-a-c
ivics-guide-pruitt-trump/521001/ (last visited June 21, 2017).
180. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (January 21, 2011) (issued by President
Obama); Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (January 23, 2007) (issued by President George W.
Bush); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (October 4, 1993) (issued by President Clinton);
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1981) (issued by President Reagan).
181. In a 2012 report to Congress, OMB retrospectively reviewed the costs and benefits of major
regulations between 2001 and 2011 and found that the estimated annual benefits for the rules between
$141 billion and $691 billion, compared to annual costs between $42.4 billion and $66.3 billion. See
GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, EPA Should Improve Adherence to Guidance for Selected
Elements of Regulatory Impact Analyses (July 2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664872.pdf (last
visited June 21, 2017). See also Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Analysis: Circular A–4
to the Heads of Executive Agencies and Establishments, 68 Fed. Reg. 58366 (2003),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/ (last visited June 21, 2017). The EPA
rules accounted for 60-82% of the benefits and 43-53% of the costs. See GAO Report, supra.
182. See, e.g., W. Harrington et al., On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates,
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-99-18.pdf (last visited June 21,

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

31

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 5

684

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

rules that may be repealed pursuant to the Executive Order will likely
have been adopted following long processes involving substantial
participation by the public and the regulated entities, as well as, in many
cases, scientific advisory boards or other advisory boards;183 the rules
will either have survived or avoided legal challenges. Further, the rules
will have survived both the past formal and informal review
processes.184 Thus, if there are a significant number of regulations that
need to be repealed, replaced, or modified pursuant to the Executive
Order, the motivation for the changes will likely be based on political
factors, rather than on scientific or technical expertise.
While the Trump Administration may have ambitious goals for
repealing and replacing environmental regulations pursuant to the
Executive Order, many roadblocks stand in the way of those goals.
First, as noted earlier, many environmental regulations are mandated
by federal law.185 While the agency may have some discretion in the
manner in which the regulations are formulated, the agency may not
have the discretion to simply repeal those regulations. To the extent that
the EPA or any other agency attempts to repeal such regulations, they
would likely be sued and the repeal of the rules would be invalidated.186
However, many other environmental regulations are not mandated by
federal law or, even if the agencies are required to adopt regulations, the
environmental statutes provide the agencies with broad discretion
regarding the manner in which those regulations are drafted.187 For those
2017); Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Analysis: Circular A–4 to the Heads of Executive
Agencies
and
Establishments,
68
Fed.
Reg.
58366
(2003),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/ (last visited June 21, 2017); Pew
Charitable Trusts, Government Regulation: Costs Lower, Benefits Greater Than Industry Estimates
(2015),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2015/05/government-regulation-costs-lo
wer-benefits-greater-than-industry-estimates (last visited June 21, 2017).
183. In addition to requirements in many environmental laws for EPA consultation with advisory
boards, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2) (2012) (requiring EPA consultation with the Clean Air
Scientific Advisory Committee when developing rules establishing national air quality standards under
the Clean Air Act), OMB guidance requires the EPA and other agencies to subject their influential rules
to elaborate peer review. See Office of Management and Budget, Final Information Quality Bulletin for
Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2667-2672 (Jan. 14, 2005).
184. See supra notes 171-174, and accompanying text. Agencies routinely revise or repeal
regulations without the prodding of formal regulatory review processes for a variety of reasons.
Occasionally, agencies revise rules to correct mistakes that were made in developing the rule. See
Wagner, et al, supra note 54, at 187-188. At other times, agencies revise rules because scientific,
technical and economic knowledge relevant to the rule changes over time “as more and better
information becomes available, models improve, and cause-effect relationships become more or less
apparent.” Id. Finally, agencies frequently revise rules to remain current with changing public attitudes
and political preferences. Id.
185. See supra notes 97-99, and accompanying text.
186. Id.
187. See supra note 52. See also O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking, supra note 54, at 482-483.
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regulations, however, the White House faces substantial obstacles in its
deregulatory quest. The biggest obstacle to the President is that the
agency must normally use the notice and comment rulemaking process
if it wishes to repeal, replace, or modify a regulation that was adopted
through notice and comment rulemaking.188 The President’s “two for
one” Executive Order explicitly acknowledges that repeals of existing
agency regulations must follow the procedures of the APA.189 While
agencies might rely on the “good cause” exception to the notice and
comment procedures to justify temporarily delaying the effective date of
rules for review by the new Administration, as discussed above, it is
unlikely that they could rely on the exception to justify repealing or
modifying existing rules without going through the normal notice and
comment process.190

188. See Beerman, supra note 102, at 982-983; Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of
Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 980 (2008)
[hereinafter “O’Connell, Political Cycles”]. While agencies may have broad authority to interpret the
law they administer through adjudication or rulemaking, including guidance documents, and courts will
defer to the agency’s choice of one method of policymaking over another, see S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947), once the agency has interpreted the law through a legislative rule, it can only
change that rule through a subsequent legislative rule. See Tunik v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 407 F.3d 1326
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 777 F.2d 759
(D.C. 1985). If the agency is merely clarifying ambiguous terms in a rule, rather than changing the rule,
though, the agency can accomplish that through nonlegislative rules, such as interpretive rules or
guidance.
189. See Exec. Order. No. 13,771, supra note 92, §2(c).
190. While it is impossible to state categorically in the abstract that none of the revisions would be
eligible for the “good cause” exception, the exception applies when an agency finds that the notice and
comment process would be “impracticable, unnecessary or contrary to the public interest” and the
exception is interpreted narrowly. See supra note 111. The notice and comment process may be
“impracticable” when “due and timely execution of [an agency's] functions would be impeded by” the
process. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 30
(1947) [hereinafter Attorney General's Manual]. The process may be “unnecessary” when the agency
action is "a minor rule or amendment in which the public is not particularly interested," id. at 31, or
makes changes that are “technical, uncontroversial, and have little or no impact on regulated entities.”
See Rosenhouse, supra note 111, §§ 6-9. Finally, the process may be contrary to the public interest
when "the interest of the public would be defeated by any requirement of advance notice." See Attorney
General’s Manual, supra at 31. Professors Michael Asimov and Ronald Levin suggest that the “public
interest” aspect of the exception is best applied when an agency must act "to meet a serious health or
safety problem, or some other risk of irreparable harm…” See Michael Asimow & Ronald M. Levin,
STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 308-09 (3d ed. 2009). In general, the “good cause”
exception primarily applies when agencies are dealing with “emergencies and typographical errors, plus
the occasional situation in which advance notice would be counterproductive.” See Kristin E. Hickman,
Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury's (Lack Of) Compliance with Administrative
Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1782 (2007). In light of the
publicity surrounding the Administration’s bold statements regarding deconstruction of the
administrative state, it is likely that most of the rules targeted for revision would not relate to
emergencies typographical errors or the occasional situation in which advance notice would be
counterproductive. Due to the likelihood of litigation to challenge repeals in accordance with the
Executive Order, the Administration will likely avoid relying on the “good cause” exception to dispense
with “notice and comment” rulemaking for rule repeals or revisions except in very limited situations.
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Notice and comment rulemaking presents several impediments to the
President’s deregulatory agenda. First and foremost, the process is time
consuming and resource intensive.191 Scholars have repeatedly asserted
that the rulemaking process has become ossified192 and that it could take
agencies five years or more to adopt major rules through the process.193
Several factors are blamed for ossification,194 including (1) executive
branch requirements for OMB review and approval of rules,195
requirements for agencies to evaluate and report on the costs and
benefits of rules196 and the impacts of rules on takings,197 federalism,198
small businesses, children’s health,199 and other topics; (2) legislatively
imposed analytical and procedural requirements under the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act,200 the Information
Quality Act,201 the Paperwork Reduction Act,202 and other laws;203 and
191. See Aaron Nielsen, Sticky Regulations, B.Y.U. Law Res. Paper No. 17-11, (2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2950732 (last visited June 21, 2017); Thomas O.
McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385-86
(1992) [hereinafter “McGarity, Some Thoughts”].
192. See Nielsen, supra note 191, at 2, 16-17 (expressing some skepticism about the ossification
claim); Johnson, Ossification’s Demise?, supra note 67, at 101; Johnson, Good Guidance, supra note
67, at 700-701; Stephen M. Johnson, Ruminations on Dissemination: Limits on Administrative and
Judicial Review under the Information Quality Act, 55 CATH.. U. L. REV. 59, 79 (2005); Johnson,
Internet, supra note 67, at 282-84; McGarity, Response, supra note 67, at 528-36; Mark Seidenfeld,
Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and
Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX.. L. REV. 483, 483-90 (1997); Pierce, Seven Ways, supra note 67, at 6062; McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 191, at 1385-86; Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, THE
STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 9-25 (1990) (discussing ossification of National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) rulemaking).
193. See McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 191, at 1385 (asserting that OSHA and FTC
rulemakings generally took more than five years).
194. Most commentators assert that all three branches of government are responsible for the
ossification. See Nielsen, supra note 191, at 8; Johnson, Ossification’s Demise?, supra note 67, at 103;
McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 191, at 1385.
195. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 180.
196. Id. Executive Order 12,866 requires agencies to prepare a cost benefit analysis of
“significant” rules and to adopt regulations only upon a “reasoned determination that the benefits of the
intended regulation justify its costs.” Id.
197. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8859–61 (Mar. 18, 1988).
198. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 10, 1999).
199. See Exec. Order No. 13,045, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,885 (Apr. 23, 1997).
200. See, Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. § 657, 5
U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012). The law requires agencies to provide Congress with cost benefit analyses,
regulatory flexibility analyses, and other information that is prepared for major rules that impact small
businesses. Id. §602-604, 801.
201. See 44 U.S.C. § 3516 (2012) (requiring agencies to respond to challenges to the “quality” of
information disclosed in, or relied upon in, rulemaking).
202. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–1549 (2012) (requiring agencies to submit information collection
requests to OMB for rules that require submission of information by 10 or more persons, among other
responsibilities).
203. See, e.g., The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2012); Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1571 (2012) (mandating thorough analysis of rules if they
would cause expenditures of more than $100 million by state, local, or tribal governments.) The
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(3) judicially imposed requirements.204 While courts have not imposed
additional procedural requirements on agencies, they have interpreted
the provisions of the APA broadly205 to require agencies to provide
significant amounts of information in proposed rulemakings,206 to limit
the extent to which final rules deviate from proposed rules,207 to
consider and reply rationally to comments from the public,208 and to
supply detailed explanations for final rules, indicating that they have
considered all of the relevant factors and alternatives in crafting the final
rule.209
Agencies tend to spend a significant amount of time ensuring that
they comply with the procedures imposed by Congress and the courts
because they recognize that they are likely to be sued when they finalize
the rulemaking.210 Former EPA Administrator William Ruckleshaus
asserted that 80% of the agency’s rules are challenged,211 and various
Regulatory Flexibility Act requires agencies to prepare a “regulatory flexibility analysis” for all
“significant” rules, identifying the impact of the rule on small businesses and identifying alternatives to
the approach taken in the rules and the impacts of the alternatives. See 5 U.S.C. §603(a) (2012). It also
requires agencies to publish a regulatory agenda in the Federal Register twice per year, identifying rules
that the agencies expect to finalize that are likely to have a significant economic impact on small
businesses. Id. §605(b).
204. See Nielsen, supra note 191, at 10; Johnson, Ossification’s Demise?, supra note 67, at 103.
205. See McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 191, at 108.
206. See Nielsen, supra note 191, at 10-11 (discussing the Portland Cement doctrine, created by
the D.C. Circuit to require agencies to disclose data on which a rule is based as part of the notice of
proposed rulemaking, in order to ensure that the public has an “opportunity to comment” on the data,
per the requirements of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).); Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, 486
F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
207. See Nielsen, supra note 191, at 11-12 (discussing the judicial interpretation of the “notice”
and “comment” requirements of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) & (c), as mandating that a final rule must
be a “logical outgrowth” of the proposed rule).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 588 F.2d 240, 252-253 (2d Cir.
1977). See also Nielsen, supra note 191, at 11 (discussing the judicial interpretation of the “concise
general statement” requirement of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), as a requirement that agencies respond to
all material or significant comments that they receive); McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 191, at
108. This requirement is becoming more onerous for agencies in the e-rulemaking era, as some
rulemakings have generated hundreds of thousands of comments that must be reviewed. See, e.g., Eric
Lipton & Coral Davenport, Critics Hear E.P.A.'s Voice in ‘Public Comments', N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/19/us/critics-hear-epas-voice-in-public-comments.html (last
visited June 21, 2017) (noting that the EPA received more than 1 million comments on its 2015
rulemaking to define “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act).
209. See Nielsen, supra note 191, at 12 (discussing the impact of “hard look” judicial review on
agency decisionmaking in notice and comment rulemaking).
210. See supra note 43 (discussing the avenues for judicial review). See also Nielsen, supra note
191, at 2-3; Johnson, Ossification’s Demise?, supra note 67, at 101; Johnson, Good Guidance, supra
note 67, at 701; Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1296 (1997); McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 191, at 1412;
Philip K. Howard, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA 87 (1994);
James Q. Wilson, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 284
(1989).
211. See Johnson, Ossification’s Demise?, supra note 67, at 101-102; William D. Ruckelshaus,
Environmental Negotiation: A New Way of Winning, Address to Conservation Foundation’s Second
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studies have found that agency rules are invalidated in 30-50% of the
cases in which they are challenged.212 In order to maximize their chance
of success in the inevitable litigation, agencies spend more time
preparing rules to ensure compliance with the applicable laws.
In addition to the time that it takes for agencies to finalize a rule after
issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking, agencies routinely spend
several years developing rulemaking proposals before issuing a notice of
proposed rulemaking.213
While the current executive, legislative and judicial procedures for
rulemaking ensure that the process will be time consuming and resource
intensive for agencies, the legislation introduced by Congress in 2017
will only compound the problem for agencies. If the legislation passes,
agencies will have to prepare and evaluate even more information to
justify a rulemaking proposal, including a proposal to repeal or revise
existing rules.214 In addition, agencies may have to utilize time
consuming and expensive trial-type formal hearing processes to
promulgate such rule revisions or repeals.215 Further, they will have to
disclose more information in the process, including a comprehensive list
of every blog post, tweet, and other communication regarding the
rule.216 If agencies fail to follow any of those procedures, fail to consider
factors that the new legislation will require them to consider or engage
in communications that will be prohibited by the new legislation, those
mis-steps will constitute additional grounds upon which opponents of
the rule revision or repeal can challenge the agency’s action. The same
devices that Congress hopes will prevent agencies from adopting new
regulations can be used to prevent agencies from pursuing a
National Conference on Environmental Dispute Resolution (Oct. 1, 1984), cited in Lawrence Susskind
& Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 134
(1985). More specifically, Ruckleshaus indicated that 80% of the agency’s major rules were challenged.
Id. In a study of EPA rules finalized between 2001 and 2005, the author of this article found that 75% of
the EPA’s “economically significant” rules were challenged. See Johnson, Ossification’s Demise?,
supra note 67, at 104.
212. See Johnson, Ossification’s Demise?, supra note 67, at 102; Jason J. Czarnezki, An
Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation & the Chevron Doctrine in
Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 790 (2008) (analyzing 93 environmental law cases
decided between 2003 and 2005 and finding that the courts affirmed the EPA’s decisions in 69% of the
cases); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825, 849 (2006) (analyzing 183 federal appellate
cases reviewing the EPA actions and finding that the courts deferred to the agency 64% of the time).
Pierce, Seven Ways, supra note 67, at 84.
213. See Wagner, et al, supra note 54, at 185; Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters,
Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L.
REV. 99, 143–44 (2011) (finding that the EPA spent, on average, four years developing air toxic
standards under the Clean Air Act before issuing notices of proposed rulemaking for those standards).
214. See supra note 119.
215. See supra note 118.
216. See supra note 119, 126-129, and accompanying text.
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deregulatory agenda to repeal and revise existing regulations.
The procedures required for notice and comment rulemaking are only
one impediment to the White House’s efforts to aggressively repeal and
replace existing regulations. Assuming that the EPA and other agencies
ultimately grind their way through the notice and comment rulemaking
process and issue final rules to repeal or revise existing regulations, the
agency action will have to withstand judicial review. The standards that
a reviewing court will apply to an agency’s repeal or revision of a rule
are the same standards that the court would apply to the initial
promulgation of the rule.217 Consequently, the repeal or revision of the
rule will need to withstand “hard look” arbitrary and capricious review,
meaning that the agency will need to provide a detailed explanation for
its decision and demonstrate that it considered all of the relevant factors
and alternatives to the action taken.218 Courts have long held that
agencies interpretations of the law and their regulations are not “carved
in stone” and that agencies can change those interpretations and
regulations over time.219 However, when they change them, they must
provide a reasonable explanation for the change.220
Even though the primary motivation for many of the repeals or
revisions of regulations that will follow the Executive Branch review
under Executive Order 13,777 will be political, it is fairly clear that an
agency cannot simply identify a change in Presidential administration as
the reason for a change in policy or the repeal or revision of a
regulation. A change in Administration is a logical and reasonable
stimulus for a re-evaluation of priorities and a re-evaluation of the scope
of discretion accorded to agencies by law and the manner in which the
agencies have exercised that discretion.221 Ultimately, however,
agencies must justify any changes to their legal interpretations or
217. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, 463 U.S. 29, 41-44 (1983) (“State Farm”) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to
the recission of a rule by the Department of Transportation). See also O’Connell, Political Cycles, supra
note 188, at 906.
218. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42-43. The other APA standards of judicial review also apply.
See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). Thus, a court could strike down a rule revision or repeal if, for instance, the
court finds that the agency action is outside its statutory authority, id. §706(2)(C), unconstitutional, id.
§706(2)(B), or in violation of procedures required by law. Id. §706(2)(D).
219. See National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 545
U.S. 967,981-982 (2005) (“Brand X”); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-864; State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41-42.
220. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42-43.
221. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981; State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); National Association of Home Builders v. EPA, 683 F.3d 1032, 1043 (D.C. Cir.
2012). As Justice Rehnquist stated in his concurring and dissenting opinion in State Farm, “[a] change
in administration . . . is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs
and benefits of its programs and regulations. As long as the agency remains within the bounds
established by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in light of
the philosophy of the administration.” See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59.
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regulations by explaining how and why the weighing of priorities within
their discretion under the law has changed, so that they now are
interpreting and applying the law in a different manner, and they must
demonstrate that their new interpretation is within the discretionary
authority granted to them by law. Although agencies’ decisions may be
influenced by purely political reasons, “hard look” review forces
agencies to justify their actions on technocratic, statutory, or scientific
bases.222
Professor Kathryn Watts and other academics have argued that “hard
look” review forces agencies to hide the real reasons for their decisions
and that courts should allow agencies to justify their actions on the basis
of political influences in appropriate cases.223 Watts suggests that
agencies should be allowed to consider political influences as an
appropriate justification for action when the influences seek to further
policy considerations or public values, but should not be allowed to
consider them as justification when the agency is simply implementing
raw or partisan politics.224
The courts and many academics, including Professor Mark

222. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review,
119 YALE L.J. 2, 5-7, 14 (2009).
223. See Watts, supra note 222, at 23-29, 32-43. Watts espouses a “political accountability”
model of agencies, as opposed to an “expertise-based” model. Id. at 32. Under that model, she argues
that agencies are legitimate because they are politically accountable, so agencies should be able to rely
on political influences from the President, other members of the Executive Branch and Congress when
acting as “mini-legislatures” through rulemaking. Id. at 8. Proceeding from that basis, she argues that
while Chevron and some other administrative law doctrines have shifted away from a focus on agency
expertise and embraced a focus on political accountability, “hard look” review has not yet done so and
should be revised to reflect the shift adopted in other doctrines. Id. at 12-13. She also argues that
allowing courts to consider the influence of political factors on agency decision-making as part of “hard
look” review will encourage agencies to disclose the real reasons for their decisionmaking, promoting
more transparent agency decisionmaking. Id.
Like Professor Watts, Dean Christopher Edley has argued that agencies should “frankly
acknowledge the role of political, ideological, or subjective analyses in their reasons and findings,” see
Christopher F. Edley, Jr., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY
190 (1990), and that courts, through arbitrary and capricious review, should give “credit [to] politics as
an acceptable and even desirable element of decisionmaking.” Id. at 192. Similarly, in 2001, before she
was appointed to the Court, Justice Kagan wrote a law review article suggesting that courts should alter
hard look review to look for political factors that demonstrate presidential leadership and accountability.
See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2246, 2380-2383 (2001).
224. See Watts, supra note 222, at 8-9. She recognizes that distinguishing between acceptable
and unacceptable political influences may be difficult, but suggests that it might be appropriate for
agencies to rely on political influences when they are designed to advance the public interest and public
values, rather than merely caving in to interest group pressure. Id. at 8-9, 53. As examples, she suggests
that it would be appropriate for an agency to rely on a pro-choice statement by a President to support a
regulatory decision that advances that pro-choice agenda, but it would be inappropriate for the agency to
make the same decision simply because the President received substantial financial support from prochoice organizations during the Presidential campaign and directed the agency to make the decision to
reward the organizations for their support. Id. at 8-9.
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Seidenfeld, disagree.225 Professor Seidenfeld argues that it is normal and
appropriate for agencies to be motivated to act by political factors,
including raw or partisan political factors, but agencies must be able to
articulate expert-driven (scientific, technical, or other) rationales for
their decision.226 He suggests that “hard look” review separates value
judgments from objective decision making and he asserts that courts
appropriately refuse to consider political factors as justifications for
agency action under “hard look” review.227
If agencies are able to provide rational, expertise-based justifications
for their decisions to repeal or revise regulations after reviewing
regulations pursuant to Executive Order 13,777, courts will likely
uphold the agencies actions. Unlike the recent challenges to President
Trump’s Executive Orders involving the travel ban and sanctuary cities,
where courts examined campaign statements, media appearances, and
interviews to determine the President’s motivation for those Executive
Orders, courts are unlikely to look beyond the reasons articulated by
agencies when they decide to repeal or revise rules and strike down the
actions because the courts concluded that the real, and inappropriate,
reasons for agency action were expressed in various Presidential
campaign or press statements.228 Under “hard look” review, courts will
examine the reasons that the agency gave for its decision at the time of
225. See Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 141 (2012). Justice Stephen Breyer strongly supports judicial review of agency
action based on expertise, as opposed to political factors. He has argued, in the past, that “[a]
depoliticized regulatory process might produce better results . . . [and] increased confidence,” see
Stephen Breyer, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 55-56, 59-60
(1993), and that there are inherent virtues to rationalization, expertise and insulation, which should be
separated from politics and public opinion. Id. at 60-63. Justice Breyer expressed his sentiments in a
dissenting opinion in F.C.C. v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., stating that the law does not permit the FCC to
“make policy choices for purely political reasons.” 129 S.Ct. 1800, 1829 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
226. See Seidenfeld, supra note 225, at 148-151, 160. Seidenfeld notes that “hard-look review
does not reject a rule because it is politically motivated, even if that motivation is a self-serving and
venal political calculation. Hard-look review accepts politically motivated rules because it concerns
itself with justification, not motivation. A policy that is motivated by the President’s desire to provide
benefits to his political supporters may nonetheless be defensible as good policy.” Id. at 151.
227. Id. at 148. He argues that the current form of hard-look review, eschewing consideration of
political factors, is consistent with both an “interest group” model of administrative agencies and a
“Presidential control” model of administrative agencies. Id. at 148-160. Seidenfeld also criticizes Watts
because he believes that her approach allows agencies to “substitute political influence for some of the
analysis that courts would otherwise require under hard-look review.” Id. at 147.
228. See, e.g., State of Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (court relied on
campaign and press statements to find that the purpose of the travel ban in the Executive Order was
discriminatory); County of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-cv-00574-WHO, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
62871 (N.D. Ca. Apr. 25, 2017) (court relied on statements made by the President to the press to find,
for purposes of resolving the standing issue, that the Executive Order would likely be applied in a
broader manner than the Executive Branch, in legal arguments to the court, was asserting it would be
applied); Hawai’i v. Trump, No. 17-00050 DKW-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36935 (D. Haw., Mar.
25, 2017) (court relied on campaign statements and other statements made by the President to the press
to find that the purpose of the travel ban in the Executive Order was discriminatory).
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the decision and will not, generally, attribute other rationales to the
agency’s action that are not provided by the agency.229
Although the repeal or modification of regulations by agencies will
not necessarily be tainted on judicial review because the agencies are
motivated by political factors, agencies may still have difficulty
justifying some of the repeals or modifications under “hard look” review
if they are changing long-standing regulations or legal interpretations
that have been supported by strong justifications in the past by the
Executive Branch. Although the Supreme Court implied, in Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company, that agencies must provide greater justification
when they change rules than when they initially adopt rules,230 the Court
later clarified in F.C.C. v. Fox TV Stations, Inc. that agencies are not
required to provide more substantial justification when they change
rules than when they first adopt rules and need not provide that the new
rule is better than the old rule.231 In Fox, the Supreme Court made it
clear that when an agency is changing a rule, it must “display awareness
that it is changing position,” and it “must show that there are good
reasons for the new policy.”232 Accordingly, when an agency has built a
strong record to support an existing rule and repeals or reverses it in a
new rulemaking, the agency will need to discuss why the prior
justifications for the rule are no longer supportable or why the agency
has prioritized other factors within its discretion to justify the new
decision than were prioritized in the past. In addition to explaining the
reasons for the change in position, the agency will likely receive
countless comments during the notice and comment period suggesting
that the agency refrain from repealing or modifying the rule, and the
agency will need to consider and respond to those comments and
consider all of the relevant factors and alternatives raised by those
229. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43; SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (“Chenery
II”); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) (establishing the bedrock administrative law
principle that “The grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which
the record discloses that its action was based.”) A court’s analysis of an agency’s action under the “hard
look” test is quite different from the analysis in the cases challenging the travel ban and sanctuary cities
Executive Orders. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, “[i]t is well established that evidence of
purpose beyond the face of the challenged law may be considered in evaluating establishment and equal
protection claims.” See State of Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d at 25. There is not similar precedent
applicable to judicial review under the “hard look” arbitrary and capricious analysis.
230. The State Farm Court suggested that “an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is
obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an
agency does not act in the first instance.” See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41.
231. See 556 U.S. 502, 515-516 (2009). The Court indicted, however, that an agency may have to
provide a more detailed justification for a change in policy in some cases, such as when the new policy
rests on factual findings that contradict those behind its earlier policy or when its earlier policy
“engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.” Id.
232. Id.
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comments.233
In repealing and revising rules in response to Executive Order 13,777,
agencies must also be vigilant to remain open to public comment on the
repeal or revision, as there may be public perceptions that the agencies
have entered the rulemaking with marching orders from the White
House and are merely going through the procedural motions to repeal or
revise the rules of prior Administrations. A series of decisions in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that
an agency does not provide an “opportunity for comment” on proposed
rules as required by the APA if the agency does not remain
“open-minded” about the issues raised and engage with the comments
submitted during the comment period.234 The “opportunity for
comment” must be a meaningful opportunity for comment.235 At the
same time, however, courts have rarely struck down agency rules on the
grounds that evidence demonstrated that the agency had an “unalterably
closed mind” during the rulemaking.236
As with any agency action, the “hard look” standard is not necessarily
the only judicial review standard that will apply when an agency repeals
or revises a rule.237 Frequently, an agency may interpret a legal term in
a statute that it administers when repealing or revising a rule. When an
agency interprets a statutory term in the context of its exercise of
legislative rulemaking authority, courts generally accord deference to
the agency’s legal interpretation under the Supreme Court’s Chevron
doctrine.238 Courts frequently rely on that Chevron deference to uphold
agency decisions to reverse their legal interpretations and regulations.239
The Supreme Court has even held that courts should accord Chevron
deference to an agency when the agency interprets a statute in a way that
233. See supra note 218.
234. See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project v. F.C.C., 652 F.3d 431, 449 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Rural
Cellular Ass’n v. F.C.C., 588 F.3d 1095, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Advocates for Highway Auto Safety v.
Federal Highway Administration, 28 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1994); McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v.
Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
235. See Rural Cellular Ass’n v. F.C.C., 588 F.3d at 1101. Arguably, if an agency decisionmaker
has made up their mind before a rulemaking begins, based on Presidential orders, the decisionmaker is
not providing the public with a meaningful opportunity for comment. See Beerman, supra note 102, at
1001.
236. See Beerman, supra note 102, at 1001-1002; Stephen M. Johnson, #Better Rules: The
Appropriate Use of Social Media in Rulemaking, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 54-58 (2017). Professor Jack
Beerman suggests that courts are reluctant to strike down agency action on these grounds because the
standard is too vague and conflicts with the realities of the political nature of agency decisionmaking.
See Beerman, supra note 102, at 1002.
237. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (outlining the standards for review of agency actions under the
APA).
238. See Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
239. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005); Smiley v. Citibank (South
Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996); Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402 (1993).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

41

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 5

694

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

conflicts with a prior judicial reading of the statute, as long as the court,
in the precedent case, indicated that the statute being interpreted was
ambiguous.240 Here again, however, Congressional legislative proposals
could make it more difficult for agencies to revise and repeal rules. As
noted above, at least one of the bills introduced to “reform”
administrative agency decision-making would eliminate Chevron
deference and allow courts to interpret statutory terms de novo.241
Consequently, if that legislation is enacted into law, courts will have
more freedom to decide that agencies are acting outside of their
statutory authority when repealing or revising regulations. Once again,
the legislation that is being advanced to halt regulation could be used to
entrench existing regulation and halt deconstruction of the
administrative state.
2. The WOTUS, Clean Power Plan, and Antiquities Act Executive
Order
In addition to issuing an Executive Order that very broadly
encourages agencies to repeal, replace, or modify regulations across the
board, the President issued several Executive Orders that urged agencies
to take very specific deregulatory actions. In the first, Executive Order
13,778, the President ordered the EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (“the Corps”) to review and rescind or revise the regulation242
that the agencies adopted in 2015 to identify the “waters of the United
States” subject to jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act (the
“WOTUS” rule),243 and to review and rescind or revise all orders,
regulations, and guidelines that implement that rule.244 The Order
micro-manages to a degree that is almost unprecedented in Executive
Orders, as it includes a provision that directs the agencies, when revising
the “waters of the United States” regulatory definition, to “consider
interpreting the term . . . in a manner consistent with the opinion of
Justice Antonin Scalia in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715
(2006).”245 Finally, the Order requires the agencies to notify the
Attorney General that they are reviewing the regulation, so that the
Attorney General could “as he deems appropriate, inform any court of
such review and take such measures as he deems appropriate”

240.
(2005).
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967
See supra note 124.
See 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015).
See Exec. Order No. 13,778, supra note 165, §2(a).
Id. §2(b).
Id. §3.
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concerning litigation relating to the rule.246 On the same day that the
order was signed, the agencies signed a notice of intent to review and
rescind or revise the rule.247 The Attorney General asked the Supreme
Court, which was reviewing a jurisdictional question central to the
numerous lawsuits that have been filed challenging the rule, to hold the
case in abeyance while the agencies review and rescind or revise the
rule, but the Court denied the government’s request.248
The second Executive Order, Executive Order 13,783 (the “Clean
Power Plan Executive Order”), required the EPA to review and rescind,
suspend, or revise several rules that were proposed or finalized in 2015
to address greenhouse gas pollution from coal-fired electric power
plants,249 and requires the agencies to notify the Attorney General when
the agency takes those actions, so that the Attorney General can notify
courts with jurisdiction over any challenges to the rule about those
actions and “request that the court[s] stay the litigation or otherwise
delay further litigation . . . .”250 The Order also directed the Secretary of
the Interior to lift a moratorium on coal leasing on federal lands and
directed the EPA and the Secretary of the Interior to review and rescind,
suspend, or revise various rules and guidance related to oil and gas
development and fracking.251
The third Executive Order, Executive Order 13,792, required the
Secretary of the Interior to review all designations of national
monuments under the Antiquities Act since January 1, 1996, where the
designation covers more than 100,000 acres or, for expansions of
national monuments, where the designation, after expansion, covers
more than 100,000 acres.252 The order directs the Secretary to determine
whether the designations resulted from a lack of public outreach and
proper coordination with State, tribal, and local officials or stakeholders
and whether they “create barriers to achieving energy independence,
restrict public access to and use of Federal lands, burden State, tribal,
and local governments, or otherwise curtail economic growth.”253 Based
on that review, the Order requires the Secretary to prepare a report for
the President to recommend Presidential action, legislative proposals, or
other actions.254 The review was spurred by complaints from Western
246. Id. §2(c).
247. See 82 Fed. Reg. 12,532 (Mar. 6, 2017).
248. See Amanda Reilly, Supreme Court to Hear WOTUS Litigation, Greenwire, Apr. 3, 2017,
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060052490 (last visited June 21, 2017).
249. See Exec. Order No. 13,783, supra note 165, §4.
250. Id. §4(d).
251. Id. §§ 6-7. The Order also rescinds several Executive actions taken by President Obama and
the White House Council on Environmental Quality to address climate change. Id. §3.
252. See Exec. Order No. 13,792, supra note 165, §2.
253. Id. §1.
254. Id. §§2(d)-(e).
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State lawmakers who argued that former Presidents have used the law
too aggressively to protect federal lands from development by private
interests, and who hoped that the review would lead to the removal of
the protections from large portions of those lands.255 Shortly after the
President issued the Order, the Secretary of the Interior released a list of
27 National Monuments that would be reviewed by the Department and
posted a notice in the Federal Register seeking public comment on the
Monuments included on the list.256
Each of the Executive Orders represents a bold assertion of Executive
power to advance a deregulatory agenda. At the same time,
implementation of each of the Orders will face significant legal
challenges, as well as public opposition.
For Executive Order 13,778, the EPA will have a difficult time
implementing the directives of the Order. First, the EPA spent many
years and resources reviewing and developing a strong scientific and
legal record to justify the regulatory definition of “waters of the United
States” that the agencies adopted in 2015.257 The agencies may find it
difficult to marshal the necessary scientific and legal justifications to
rationally reverse course so quickly after adopting the 2015 rule. Neither
the science nor the law has changed since 2015; only the President has
changed. The process to adopt a new rule to replace the 2015 rule and
to attempt to provide legally sufficient support for the new rule to
counter the record built by the agency for the prior rule and to respond
to the inevitable comments that will oppose the new rule will take
years.258 Even if the agencies manage to complete the rulemaking
255. See Dan Mercia & Kevin Liptak, Trump Order Could Roll Back Public Lands Protections
from
3
Presidents,
CNN,
Apr.
26,
2017,
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/25/politics/donald-trump-federal-lands-antiquities/index.html (last visited
June 21, 2017).
256. See 82 Fed. Reg. 22,016 (May 11, 2017). The docket for the agency action, including the
public comments on the notice, is available at https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=DOI-2017-0002
(last visited June 21, 2017).
257. See Stephen M. Johnson, WETLANDS LAW: A COURSE SOURCE 143-146 (eLANGDELL
PRESS, 2016). See also 80 Fed. Reg. 37054-37073 (June 29, 2015) (discussing the scientific and legal
justifications for the rule). At the centerpiece of the scientific justification for the rule was the
“Connectivity Study”, a review or more than 1,200 peer reviewed scientific publications. See U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Connectivity of Streams and Wetlands to Downstream Waters: A
Review and Synthesis of the Scientific Evidence (Final Report), EPA/600/R-14/475F, (Washington, DC:
U.S.
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
(2015)),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/fedrgstr_activites/7724357376745F48852579E60043E88C/$
File/WOUS_ERD2_Sep2013.pdf (last visited June 21, 2017).
258. It took the agencies eight years and two guidance documents to issue final rules amending
the definition of “waters of the United States” after the Supreme Court’s Rapanos decision. See
Johnson, WETLANDS LAW, supra note 257, at 139-146. The agencies received over one million public
comments on the 2015 rule. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Docket for “Definition of
‘Waters
of
the
United
States’
Under
the
Clean
Water
Act,”
https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880 (last visited June 21, 2017).
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process to adopt a new definition of “waters of the United States” within
the four years of the President’s Administration, the new rules will be
challenged and likely stayed for years pending the resolution of those
challenges.259 The Supreme Court has thrice reviewed the agencies’
regulatory definition of “waters of the United States” and challenges to
any amendment of the rule in response to the Executive Order are
inevitable.260 The 2015 regulations were stayed pursuant to litigation
shortly after they were adopted and have never been enforced.261
In addition, the agencies wrote their 2015 rule to comply with an
interpretation of the Clean Water Act that was articulated by Justice
Kennedy in Rapanos v. United States and has been adopted by most of
the appellate courts in response to the Supreme Court’s divided opinion
in that case.262 The President’s Executive Order directs the agencies to
revise the rule to comply with an interpretation of the Clean Water Act
outlined by Justice Scalia in a plurality opinion in that case,263 which has
not been adopted by any of the appellate courts as the primary test for
Clean Water Act jurisdiction.264 If the agencies adopt a rule that follows
that directive, it would appear to be inconsistent with the interpretation
of the law that has been adopted in all of the appellate courts.265 The rule
would not necessarily conflict with those interpretations; however, the
agency would need to rationally explain why it is choosing to adopt a
much narrower interpretation of the term “waters of the United States”
than courts have suggested is authorized and than the agency has
previously suggested is necessary to protect traditional navigable waters
under the Clean Water Act. This could be legally difficult for the
agencies.
The unusual manner in which the Executive Order is drafted raises
259. The 2015 rule was challenged by environmental groups, 27 states, 14 agriculture and
industry groups in separate lawsuits. See Johnson, WETLANDS LAW, supra note 257, at 146. Lawsuits
were filed in 18 different federal district courts and 8 appellate courts. See Richard Lazarus, Who’s On
First? District, Appeals Courts Grapple with Jurisdiction, Env. L. Forum 13, Sept./Oct. 2016,
http://environment.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ELI-Sept-Oct-2016-1.pdf (last visited
June 21, 2017).
260. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
261. See Johnson, WETLANDS LAW, supra note 257, at 146.
262. Id. at 142. Justice Kennedy wrote that agencies had jurisdiction over waters that had a
“significant nexus” to traditional navigable waters. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759.
263. See Rapanos, 547 at 719.
264. See Johnson, WETLANDS LAW, supra note 257, at 142.
265. Executive Orders cannot change existing law, see, e.g. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74
F.3d 1322, 1332-1339 (D.C. Cir. 1996), so the fact that President Trump’s Executive Order directs the
agencies to adopt an interpretation of the law that may be at variance with the Supreme Court’s reading
of the law would not save the agency regulation. Indeed, the WOTUS Executive Order explicitly
recognize that the agencies may only act, pursuant to the Executive Order, “to the extent authorized by
law.” See Exec. Order No. 13,778, supra note 165, §4.
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the potential for additional legal challenges to a rule by the EPA and the
Corps that adopts the Scalia test to define “waters of the United States.”
The Clean Water Act authorizes the agencies, and not the President, to
adopt regulations to carry out the Clean Water Act.266 To the extent that
the agencies adhere to the President’s micro-management of agency
decision making and adopt a definition consistent with the Scalia test,
challengers may argue that the rule is invalid because the President
exercised the discretion that was delegated to the agencies by Congress,
and that the President has no authority to make rules under the Clean
Water Act.267 Even if that argument is unsuccessful, challengers may
argue that the agencies adopted the revised definition of “waters of the
United States” without providing the public a meaningful opportunity
for comment, as the agencies entered the comment period with an
unalterably closed mind regarding the form of the final rule in light of
the fact that they were adopting a rule to meet the test mandated by the
President’s Executive Order.268
Since Executive Order 13,783 (the “Clean Power Plan Executive
Order”) does not interfere as directly with the EPA’s exercise of
discretion as Executive Order 13,778, it will probably not face the
challenges regarding Presidential exercise of rulemaking authority or
agency rulemaking with an unalterably closed mind. Nevertheless, like
the WOTUS rule, the EPA built a very strong technical and legal
foundation to support the rules addressed in the Clean Power Plan
Executive Order and completed two of the rules within the last two
years.269 Like the WOTUS rule, the EPA may find it difficult to build a
technical record and craft legal arguments to support a decision to repeal
the rules so quickly after they were adopted, and to respond rationally to
the inevitable flood of comments opposing the repeal of the rules.270 As
266. See 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(2012).
267. See Beerman, supra note 102, at 1000-1001, 1003-1004 (discussing the contours and limits
of such a challenge in the abstract, as opposed to applied to the WOTUS rule).
268. See supra notes 234-236, and accompanying text. See also Beerman, supra note 102, at
1001.
269. See “Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units," 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (October 23, 2015) (“Clean Power Pln”); "Standards of
Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units," 80 Fed. Reg. 64,509 (October 23, 2015).
270. Both rules were challenged shortly after they were initially adopted and the Supreme Court
took the unusual step of issuing a stay of the Clean Power Plan rule pending resolution of the challenges
to the rule in the D.C. Circuit. See West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S.Ct. 1000 (U.S. 2016). After the President
issued Executive Order 13,783, the Attorney General asked the D.C. Circuit to stay the challenges to the
rules addressed in the order, and the court granted the government’s request, but only agreed to hold the
challenge to the Clean Power Plan in abeyance for 60 days. See West Virginia v. Environmental
Protection
Agency,
No.
15-1363
(D.C.
Cir.
Apr.
28,
2017),
http://www.environmentallawandpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/186/2017/04/CPP-Abeyance.pdf
(last visited June 21, 2017). The Court ordered the EPA to file status reports every 30 days and required
the parties to file supplemental briefs to address whether the case should be remanded to the EPA
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with the WOTUS rule, the process to repeal or revise the rules targeted
by Executive Order 13,778 could take the entire length of the
President’s Administration to complete and will likely be tied up in
litigation for years after they are completed. In some respects, this is a
win for the Administration because the rules targeted in both Executive
Orders will not be enforced in the interim. In other respects, however, if
the Administration is ultimately successful in making such drastic
changes to the rules so quickly after adopting the rules in 2015 and
courts uphold those changes, the agencies may be able to make an
equally extreme course correction when a new Administration takes
office. In that case, the deregulatory success of the Administration could
be as ephemeral as the streams that will be left unprotected by the
Administration’s amendment of the WOTUS rule.271
The Administration could face more fundamental legal challenges in
the implementation of Executive Order 13,792 regarding the Antiquities
Act. Supporters of the Order anticipate that it will lead to actions by the
President to abolish or reduce the size of national monuments.272
However, while the Antiquities Act authorizes the President to create
national monuments,273 it does not provide the President with any
express authority to abolish or revoke national monument
designations.274 Congress has the power, under the Property Clause of
the Constitution, “to dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations” respecting federal lands.275 While Congress, in the
Antiquities Act, delegated to the President the power to impose limits on
land use to protect federal lands by designating them as national
monuments,276 only Congress can abolish or revoke national monument
instead of held in abeyance. Id. If the case is remanded to the EPA, the challenge in the D.C. Circuit
would be resolved, so the Supreme Court’s stay would be lifted and the rules would take effect.
271. The regulatory definition of “waters of the United States” adopted by the EPA and the Corps
included various intermittent and ephemeral waters, which sparked a debate among the Justices
regarding the scope of the agencies’ jurisdiction over such waters. See Rapanos, 547 at 725-738 (Scalia,
J., plurality) (rejecting jurisdiction); 547 at 769-770 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (acknowledging that some
ephemeral waters may be regulated); 547 at 801-807 (Stevens, J, dissenting) (deferring to the agencies’
interpretation).
272. See supra note 255.
273. See 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2012).
274. See Mark Squillace, Eric Biber, Nicholas S. Bryner, and Sean B. Hecht, Presidents Lack the
Authority to Abolish or Diminish National Monuments, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE (2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2967807 (last visited June 21, 2017); Alexandra M.
Wyatt, Antiquities Act: Scope of Authority for Modification of National Monuments, Cong. Res. Serv.
Rep.
No.
R44687,
Nov.
14,
2016,
http://www.law.indiana.edu/publicland/files/national_monuments_modifications_CRS.pdf (last visited
June 21, 2017).
275. See U.S. Const., Art. IV, §3, cl.2.
276. Congress can delegate power to the President as long as it establishes an intelligible principle
to guide the Executive’s exercise of discretion. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394 (1928).
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designations.277 The President might have authority to reduce the size of
national monuments, but the extent of that authority has never been
tested in court.278 If the President decides to abolish or reduce the size of
national monuments after the review required by the Executive Order,
the Administration will surely face legal challenges, as there appears to
be very little public support for the elimination or reduction of

277. See Squillace, et al, supra note 274, at 2; Arnold Porter Kaye Scholer, The President Has No
Power Unilaterally to Abolish a National Monument Under the Antiquities Act of 1906,
http://democrats-naturalresources.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Arnold%20&%20Porter%20Legal%20Me
mo%20on%20Revocation%20of%20National%20Monuments.pdf (last visited June 21, 2017). A 1938
Attorney General Opinion, provided to President Coolidge by his Attorney General when the President
was considering rescinding the designation of the Castle Pinckney National Monument, concluded that
the President does not have the power to revoke the designation of a national monument. See Proposed
Abolishment of Castle Pinckney Nat’l Monument, 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 185, 185 (1938).
Professor Squillace and his co-authors argue that there is additional support for the limitation
of the President’s power in that the text, structure and legislative history of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (“FLPMA”) , adopted after the Antiquities Act, clearly demonstrate that Congress did
not intend to authorize the President to abolish national monuments. See Squillace, et al, supra note 274,
at 3. John Yoo and Todd Gaziano argue, to the contrary, that the President has implied powers to
revoke national monument designation, based on the President’s constitutional Executive Power. See
John Yoo and Todd Gaziano, American Enterprise Institute, Presidential Authority to Revoke or Reduce
National
Monument
Designations,
1,3,
Mar.
2017,
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Presidential-Authority-to-Revoke-or-Reduce-National
-Monument-Designations.pdf (last visited June 21, 2017).
278. See Yoo and Gaziano, supra note 277, at 1. The Antiquities Act provides the monuments
“shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to
be protected.” See 54 U.S.C. §320301(a)-(b) (2006 & Supp. 2015). Yoo and Gaziano argue, therefore,
that the President, at a minimum, has the authority to reduce the size of national monuments when they
are not limited in size to the “smallest area comparable with proper care and management of the objects
to be protected.” See Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 277, at 1. They note that several Presidents have, in the
past through Executive action, reduced the size of national monuments. Id. at 15. In addition, the 1938
Attorney General Opinion did not state that the President lacked the power to reduce the size of national
monuments. See Wyatt, Antiquities Act, supra note 274, at 5.
Professors Squillace and his co-authors admit that Presidents reduced the size of national
monuments at various times since the enactment of the Antiquities Act, but they argue that no President
has reduced the size of a monument since the enactment of the FLPMA, in which, they argue, Congress
made it clear that Presidents lack that authority. See Squillace, et al, supra note 274, at 6-7. Further, they
note that the President’s authority to reduce the size of national monuments has never been tested in
court. Id.
Critics of recent National Monument designations argue that the Antiquities Act was never
intended to authorize the President to protect such large amounts of federal land from development. See
Sean Hecht, Politicians and Commentators who Criticize Recent national Monuments are Making Up
Their
Own
Version
of
History,
Legal
Planet,
May
8,
2017,
http://legal-planet.org/2017/05/08/politicians-and-commentators-who-criticize-recent-national-monume
nts-are-making-up-their-own-version-of-history/ (last visited June 21, 2017). However, many of the first
monuments designated by Presidents under the Antiquities Act, covered more than a million acres,
including the Glacier Bay National Monument (more than 1 million acres), designated by President
Coolidge in 1925 and the Death Valley National Monument (1.6 million acres), designated by President
Hoover in 1933. Id. The Supreme Court upheld the President’s authority to designate the 800,000 acre
Grand Canyon National Monument in Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
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protection for those lands.279 The DOI received more than 100,000
comments in response to its request for public input on the review of the
national monuments and 96% of the submissions expressed support for
the current designations, with only 3% expressing opposition.280
V. THE POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO NOT ENFORCE THE LAW
In addition to the tools outlined above, the Executive Branch can
weaken, but not necessarily deconstruct, the administrative state by
refusing to enforce the environmental laws or regulations or by
interpreting those laws and regulations in ways that benefit the regulated
entities.281 As noted above, the federal environmental laws generally
provide the EPA and other agencies with a wide variety of
administrative, civil, and criminal enforcement tools but provide the
agencies with substantial discretion to decide how to use those tools.282
The laws generally do not require agencies to bring enforcement actions
whenever someone violates the laws or regulations, and the Supreme
Court has held that an agency’s decision to not bring an enforcement
action is generally unreviewable because agencies are in the best
position to determine how to allocate scarce enforcement resources.283
Courts will review an agency’s failure to bring an enforcement action
when a statute provide standards to regulate the agency’s exercise of
discretion, but most environmental statutes do not include such
standards.284 Courts might also review an agency’s exercise of
enforcement discretion when a challenger can demonstrate that the
agency is making decisions in a manner that is discriminatory, but that is
a very limited exception.285 Just as courts rarely review agencies’
decisions to not enforce the law, Congress spends little time on
oversight of agency enforcement strategy.286
279. See Jennifer Yachnin, Comments on Interior Review Heavily Favor Status Quo - Group,
GREENWIRE, May 26, 2017, https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060055234 (last visited June
21, 2017).
280. Id.
281. See Kim, supra note 36, at 97 (finding that the Department of Education’s Office of Civil
Rights relied on the strategic use of discretion to implement policies to prohibit discrimination in the
nation’s primary, secondary and post-secondary schools); Tom Campbell, Executive Action and
Nonaction, 95 N.C.L. REV. 553, 570 (2017).
282. See supra note 53. See also Ruhl & Robisch, supra note 52, at 101; Rachel E. Barkow,
Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129, 1130-1131 (2016).
283. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). See also Kim, supra note 36, at 103; Campbell,
supra note 281, at 581; Barkow, supra note 282, at 1131-1132.
284. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 834-835. See also Campbell, supra note 281, at 570.
285. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 838. See also Campbell, supra note 281, at 574-575.
286. See Kim, supra note 36, at 103-104; Barkow, supra note 282, at 1133-1134. Congress does,
however, occasionally oversee agency enforcement discretion by limiting the discretion through riders
to prohibit the use of funding to enforce various policies. See Campbell, supra note 281, at 576.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

49

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 5

702

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

Accordingly, the Executive Branch can effectively deregulate by
simply refusing to bring enforcement actions against persons who
violate the environmental laws or specific provisions of the
environmental laws or by imposing very minor sanctions on persons
who violate the environmental laws. While the Executive Branch might
articulate this strategy in a directive to enforcement staff,287 it can avoid
most external oversight by courts, Congress, and the public if it avoids
memorializing the strategy in written documents and opts to provide oral
directives or to require approval of enforcement activity by a limited
group of decision-makers who are aware of the strategy.288
The Executive Branch can also take steps to deregulate by refusing to
defend challenges to regulations or actions that were taken by prior
Administrations or agree to settle those cases on terms that are favorable
to the regulated entities,289 although the government’s power is limited
to some extent, in that non-parties—such as environmental groups—
frequently intervene in the legal challenges, and those groups may
defend the government’s action when the government declines to do so,
and may object to the terms of sweetheart settlements.290
Although the Executive Branch may attempt to deregulate through the
strategic exercise (on non-exercise) of its enforcement powers, the
federal environmental laws impose several impediments to that strategy.
First, the environmental laws generally include provisions that authorize
States to administer and to enforce most of the permitting programs in
those laws, in conjunction with the federal government, and most States
have taken over many of those programs.291 Under the statutes, the
287. See Kim, supra note 36, at 93-94. Agencies frequently issue guidance documents or policies
to provide direction to regional and local enforcement staff when implementing an enforcement strategy.
Id. While such guidance provides notice (and reassurance) to regulated entities, it increases oversight by
the public and Congress. Id. at 107.
288. Id. at 93-94, 100, 105-106. If an enforcement decision does not result in a final adjudication,
and most don’t, it will not be reviewed by courts and is unlikely to be scrutinized by Congress or the
public, who are likely unaware of it. Id. at 102-103, 105-106. Of the tools available to agencies to make
policy (legislative rulemaking, adoption of guidance documents, exercise of enforcement discretion), the
strategic use of discretion is subject to the least external controls and oversight. Id. at 95, 102.
289. See O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking, supra note 54, at 530-531. The Trump Administration
has asked federal appellate courts to delay review of several rules, which it does not plan to defend as
written, including the Clean Power Plan, supra note 270, ozone standards under the Clean Air Act, see
Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 15-1385, (D.C. Cir., Apr. 11, 2017) (Order),
http://www.environmentallawandpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/186/2017/04/epa2017_0722.pdf
(last visited June 21, 2017), and limits on fracking on federal lands. See Juliet Eilperin, Interior
Department to Withdraw Obama-Era Fracking Rule, Filings Reveal, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2017,
http://tiny.cc/3k4yly (last visited June 21, 2017).
290. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.
291. See supra note 44. For instance, forty seven States have taken over authority to administer
the Clean Water Act Section 402 permitting program. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
NPDES
State
Program
Information:
State
Program
Authority,
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-state-program-information (last visited June 21, 2017). One of the
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States that have taken over the permitting programs generally have
primary enforcement authority.292 As a result, even if the federal
government wanted to deregulate by choosing to not enforce the laws or
regulations, it would be limited, to some degree, because States with
delegated programs might choose to enforce the law anyway.
In addition, the federal environmental laws generally include citizen
suit provisions that allow any person, including environmental groups or
concerned citizens, to sue any person who is violating those laws.293 The
laws preclude suit if the federal government or a State is enforcing the
law, but allow citizens to sue when the government is not.294 They also
allow citizens to intervene in government enforcement actions and to
oversee the process through which the government and regulated entities
settle those cases.295 Thus, the citizen suit provisions limit the extent to
which the federal government can protect regulated entities by choosing
to not enforce the law against them.
The federal environmental laws provide a further check on federal
environmental deregulation because they generally include explicit nonpreemption provisions. Most of the laws provide that States can
administer their own environmental laws that are at least as stringent (if
not more so) than the federal laws.296 Accordingly, even if the federal
government, state government, and citizens do not enforce the federal
environmental laws, states private parties will be able to use state and
local laws to protect the environment. When the Trump Administration
expressed its intentions to repeal and revise the Clean Power Plan and
exit the Paris agreement on climate change, for instance, States and local
governments announced their intentions to continue to take steps under
their separate authorities to impose restrictions on greenhouse gas
emissions in order to address global climate change.297
ways that Congress traditionally designs administrative regulatory structures to avoid underenforcement is by allowing states to share enforcement authority with the federal government. See
Barkow, supra note 282, at 1142.
292. See supra note 44.
293. See supra note 45. This is another tool that Congress traditionally uses to prevent underenforcement by agencies. See Barkow, supra note 282, at 1143.
294. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (2012) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. §300j-8(a) (2012) (Safe
Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (2012) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (2012) (Clean Air Act).
295. Id.
296. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §1370 (2012) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. §6929 (2012) (RCRA); 42
U.S.C. §7416 (2012) (Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. §9614(a) (2012) (Superfund).
297. See Steven Mufson, These Titans of Industry Just Broke with Trump’s Decision to Exit the
POST,
June
1,
2017,
Paris
Accords,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/06/01/these-titans-of-industry-just
-broke-with-trumps-decision-to-exit-the-paris-accords/?utm_term=.77746e870de3 (last visited June 21,
2017). Thirty states joined a statement condemning the decision to withdraw from the Paris agreement
and expressed their intention to continue to take steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the state
beyond those required by federal law. Id.
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Even if the Executive Branch takes steps to deregulate through nonenforcement of environmental laws, those steps are ultimately
temporary and can be reversed when there is a change in
Administration. Regulated entities recognize that simple fact, which is
why they are another impediment to the Executive Branch’s attempts to
deregulate through non-enforcement of the law. While regulated entities
frequently favor deregulation, they also favor stable regulation.298 When
rules are adopted through notice and comment rulemaking, they are
generally stable because the process to repeal and revise is timeconsuming and resource intensive.299 Although ossification of the
rulemaking process is frequently criticized, it benefits regulated entities
by providing assurance that they can make longer-term plans against
that stable regulatory structure.300 Thus, if an Administration chooses to
not enforce regulations, but does not act to repeal those regulations,
regulated entities likely understand that the regulations could be
enforced again as soon as a new Administration takes office.
Accordingly, regulated entities are unlikely to make changes to their
operations or business plans to avoid complying with existing, but
unenforced, regulations, unless it is possible to reverse those changes
without significant cost in the future when a new Administration
chooses to enforce them. Just as States pledged to continue efforts to
address climate change despite President Trump’s deregulatory actions,
billionaire philanthropist Michael Bloomberg pledged to donate $15
million to cover the United States’ commitments under the Paris
agreement, and businesses have committed to go beyond compliance

298. See Kai Ryssdal, Weekly Wrap: What Business Is Saying about Trump's Paris Agreement
Withdrawal,
Marketplace,
Jun.
1,
2017,
https://www.marketplace.org/2017/06/02/economy/weekly-wrap/weekly-wrap-what-business-saying-ab
out-trumps-paris-agreement (last visited June 21, 2017).
299. See supra notes 191-213.
300. See Nielsen, supra note 191, at 4-6, 24-29. As Professor Aaron Nielsen explains, “Agencies
not only seek to regulate today’s three-dimensional world, but they also often act to encourage the
emergence of a preferred future that does not yet exist . . . . Agencies . . . often require investment by
private parties to meet long-term regulatory goals – investment that can only be recouped if the
regulatory scheme does not materially change for years. If regulated parties are not confident that the
scheme will remain unchanged, then they will invest less in agency-favored priorities . . . To effectively
regulate into the future, agencies thus need a ‘commitment mechanism’ – some way to credibly
convince regulated parties that administrative policy will not change too quickly . . . . [O]ssification can
act as an agency commitment mechanism . . . . To the extent that regulated parties know that regulators
cannot quickly change regulatory schemes, they can proceed with greater confidence to do what an
agency . . . would like them to do.” Id. at 4-6. Nielsen notes that, without ossification, regulated entities
would be concerned that agencies could change the rules that apply to them at any time, in light of the
Supreme Court’s Fox and Brand X decisions. Id. at 24-26. Professor Wendy Wagner and her associates
similarly noted that regulated entities will have difficulty engaging in long-term planning when agencies
can frequently, and easily, change the rules that apply to their businesses. See Wagner, et al, supra note
54, at 244.
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with existing rules to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.301 They
recognize that more stringent enforcement of greenhouse gas emissions
is inevitable in the future and makes economic sense, so they are
planning for the long-term and ignoring the short-term deregulatory
actions of the current Administration.302
VI. CONCLUSION
Deconstructing the administrative state is a Sisyphean task, which
requires a commitment from Congress and the Executive Branch to
work together to enact laws that eliminate agencies or greatly reduce
their powers. In the absence of such joint action, a President’s efforts to
drastically reduce federal regulation will only yield transitory results.
This is evidenced by the efforts of the current Administration to reduce
federal environmental regulation. Although the Executive Branch and
many members of Congress have vilified the Environmental Protection
Agency and federal environmental safeguards, a majority of the public
still supports the environmental protection efforts of the federal
301. See Leanna Garfield, Billionaire Michael Bloomberg Is Launching a Coalition to Defy
Trump
and
Uphold
the
Paris
Agreement,
Bus.
Insider,
Jun.
2,
2017,
http://www.businessinsider.com/michael-bloomberg-paris-agreement-coalition-2017-6 (last visited June
21, 2017) (noting that 30 cities, 3 states, more than 80 university presidents, and more than 100
companies are pledging to uphold the Paris agreement, regardless of whether the United States
withdraws from the agreement); Venessa Wong, Cora Lewis, Leticia Miranda & Matthew Zeitlin, Big
Companies
Defy
Trump
on
Climate
Change,
CNBC,
Mar.
30,
2017,
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/30/big-companies-defy-trump-on-climate-change.html (last visited June
21, 2017); Jennifer Rubin, Trump’s Climate-Change Denial Rattles U.S. Businesses, WASH. POST, May
9, 2017, http://tiny.cc/jl4yly (last visited June 21, 2017) (noting that more than 300 companies,
including 72 with annual revenues exceeding $100 million, sent President Trump a letter, urging him to
not abandon the Paris agreement).
302. See Rubin, supra note 301; Devin Henry, Oil, Tech Giants Tell Trump to Stay in Paris Deal,
The
Hill,
Apr.
26,
2017,
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/330621-oil-tech-giants-tell-trump-to-stay-in-paris-deal
(last visited June 21, 2017) (noting that BP, Shell, Google, Microsoft, Walmart and many other
companies sent a letter to the President, urging the President to stay in the Paris agreement because the
agreement creates jobs for American businesses, puts them on a level playing field with international
competitors, and minimizes the risks that climate change poses to the companies). The nation’s largest
coal fired utilities, American Electric Power, Southern Company, and Duke Energy, are all retiring their
older coal plants and switching to natural gas and renewables, despite the Trump Administration’s
efforts to repeal or relax environmental regulation of coal extraction and use. See Ken Silverstein, Will
Undoing The Stream Protection Rule Really Help Coal?, Forbes, Feb. 3, 2017,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2017/02/03/will-undoing-the-stream-protection-rule-reallyhelp-coal/#40bb8a8a40bb (last visited June 21, 2017). In a recent Wall Street Journal interview, the
CEO of Duke Energy stated, “Because of the competitive price of natural gas and the declining price of
renewables, continuing to drive carbon out makes sense for us . . . . Administrations will change during
the life of our business, and we’ll continue to move forward in a way that makes sense for our investors
and our customers.” See Wong, et al, supra note 301 (also quoting representatives of Nestle, General
Mills and the Gap, explaining the economic benefits for those companies of pursuing sustainable
business practices, regardless of government deregulatory efforts).
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government, so Congress will not eliminate the EPA or repeal the major
federal environmental laws that give the agency its powers.
As long as those laws remain in place and provide the EPA with the
authority to interpret and enforce the laws, the power of the President or
Congress to act unilaterally to deconstruct the administrative state is
limited. As demonstrated above, the Constitution, the Administrative
Procedures Act, and the federal environmental laws create a complex
system of checks and balances to limit the power of any of the branches
to deconstruct the administrative state in the environmental arena. While
Congress was able to revoke a few environmental regulations adopted at
the end of the last Presidential Administration that certainly does not
constitute the deconstruction of the administrative state.
Similarly, while the President appointed a deregulatory EPA
Administrator who will likely relax environmental enforcement and the
President is taking actions to reduce the EPA’s budget, revise existing
regulations, and halt adoption of new regulations, Congress, courts,
States, and the public can use the checks outlined above that are
available through the Constitution and federal laws to limit those
deregulatory efforts. To the extent that the Executive branch can
overcome all of those obstacles to deconstruct the administrative state,
its efforts will only be transitory, as a subsequent Administration can
reverse the Administration’s actions unless the Administration can work
with Congress to codify its deregulatory efforts as laws. This is unlikely
to happen in light of the strong public support for environmental
protection. Consequently, while the future of federal environmental
regulation may seem momentarily dim as a result of the
Administration’s broad pronouncements regarding the evils of
environmental regulation and as a result of the flurry of Executive
activity accompanying the rhetoric, the prospects for reinvigoration of
federal environmental regulation remain strong over the long term. The
environmental administrative state will not be deconstructed in the
foreseeable future.
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